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Articles
SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES
THE DANGEROUS POLITICALIZATION OF
THE MILITARY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
W. Kent Davis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears
into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war any more.1
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Cold
War in the early 1990's, the American public rejoiced at the thought of
new roles for its military. With the Soviet threat a memory, politicians
and commentators began planning new missions for the nation's fighting
forces and reveled at the many plowshares they believed could be
formed from the swords of the old Cold War forces. As a result, the
armed forces have been called on to perform a wide variety of tasks only
marginally involving fighting and winning wars, tasks commonly called
in military jargon "Operations Other Than War," or simply "OOTW." 2
These tasks have encompassed everything from involvement in criminal
law enforcement, to international peacekeeping (or even peacemaking), to
bold social experiments within the ranks.3 As one journalist has put it,

Member of the State Bar of Georgia. J.D. (magna cum laude), Georgia State University;
B.S., Louisiana State University. Past Editor in Chief, Georgia State Law Review. The
author served on active duty as a Naval officer from 1986 through 1994, serving aboard
USS MISSOURI (BB 63), USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72), and at several shore
installations. These experiences gave him the unique opportunity to closely observe many
of the trends discussed in this article. The author would like to thank Professors L. Lynn
Hogue and Charles A. Marvin of Georgia State University College of Law. Their instruction
and guidance was instrumental in the completion of this article. The views and opinions
expressed in this article are solely those of the author. This article is dedicated with great
appreciation and respect to the men and women of the U.S. armed forces, who put their
lives on the line for their country yet are not always given the thanks they so richly
deserve.
IIsaiah 2:4.
2 See Ron Martz, Role of the Military: Caught Between a War and a Calm Place, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Oct. 5,1997, at G2.
3 For a comprehensive list of military operations tackled by the U.S. armed forces in the
1990's, please see Appendix I. The list of operations in this appendix illustrates the wide
variety and new nature of roles the military has been called upon to assume.
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the military now finds itself "caught between a war and a calm place"
4
when tackling these new roles.
Despite the seemingly cheery predictions painted at the end of the
Cold War, things have not always turned out as some had hoped.5 The
new roles have clearly caused some anxiety for the military and the
public. Nowhere is this anxiety more pronounced than within the ranks
of the armed forces themselves. For example, Air Force Magazine has
reported that the "[m]orale and confidence of the troops are growing
concerns.
The men and women of the armed forces are more
apprehensive than we have seen them in many years." 6 An even more
alarmed observation comes from former Secretary of the Navy James
Webb: "These have been uniquely difficult times for military leaders.
4 Martz, supranote 2.

5 The United States is by no means unique in this respect. Our former adversary, now
reformulated as the Russian Republic, has undergone even more turmoil in its quest to
restructure its military. At least one commentator worriedly compares the military
situation in Russia with Weimar Germany prior to World War II and ominously notes that
there is little civilian control over the Russian military. See Richard Pipes, Is Russia Still an
Enemy?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept. 19,1997, at 65. Though beyond the scope of this paper, the
sometimes-hectic Russian attempts to restructure the former Red Army are worth further
exploration. For some incisive comments on these efforts, see the following sources: Ralph
Ruebner, Foreword to Development of the Democratic Institutions & the Rule of Law in the
Former Soviet Union, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 767 (1995); Robert Sharlet, Reinventing the
Russian State: Problems of Constitutional Implementation, 28 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 775 (1995);
Robert Sharlet, TransitionalConstitutionalism:Politics and Law in the Second Russian Republic,
14 WiS. INT'L L.J. 495 (1996); Mark Galeotti, Russia's Military Under a New Minister, JANE'S
INTELLIGENCE REV., Sept. 1, 1997, at 387; Ian Kemp, Russia Pledges Better Conditions for
Military, JANE's DEFENCE WKLY., Jan. 15, 1997, at 3; Paul Mann, Russia's Defense Paralysis,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May 26, 1997, at 64; Gloria Gibbs Marullo, Woes of a
Crumbled Empire, THE RETIRED OFFICER MAG., Feb. 1997, at 32; Pipes, supra (noting that "[i]t
is common knowledge that Russia's armed forces are destitute and demoralized. Officers
drive taxis; soldiers engage in crime for the money. There is so much draft-dodging that
officers are believed to constitute half of military personnel."); Defense Official Outlines
Military Modernization Plan, AEROSPACE DAILY, Mar. 3, 1997, at 319; Russia--New Defense
Chief Fits New Kremlin Criteria, PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF. NEWS CAPSULES, May 23, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 7724550; Yeltsin Fires Defense Minister Over Stalled Reforms, FLORIDA
TODAY, May 23, 1997, at 10A.
Military woes in the wake of the end of the Cold War are not limited to the U.S. and
Russia by any means, nor to their allies. The Third World has seen turmoil in this respect, a
byproduct of "heightened international intolerance for military governments after the Cold
War." Indonesia'sMilitary Faces Big Trial Ahead, MARIETTA DAILY J., Feb. 22, 1998.
6Colonel Charles J.Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S.
Military, 29 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 341, 373 n. 232 (1994) (quoting Warning Signs on National
Security, AIR FORCE MAG., Nov. 1993, at 2); see also FRONTLINE Show #1502 (PBS television
broadcast, Oct. 15, 1996) (transcript available at <http://www2.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/navy/script.html>) (quoting Senator John McCain: "But we've got to
restore the morale, which I think is suffering right now in the Navy, for the national
security.")
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Our generation's complex and volatile political debates [have] resulted
in unprecedented intrusions into command relations because of new
concepts of limited warfare, increased judicial oversight, and a variety of
7
programs mandated under the rubric of equal opportunity."
These observations may have evidence in some alarming statistics
coming out of the armed forces these days. For example, in 1995, 53% of
the military leaders finishing tours as commanding officers of naval
aviation squadrons-officers who had performed well for two decades
in a manner that put them on track as potential admirals--left the Navy
out of concern over the future of the military rather than continue their
careers. 8 In no previous year had that number risen to even 25%. 9
Situations such as these can operate as a metaphor for the entire military.
Dire statistics are not limited to compartments of the U.S. military,
however, for they extend to our global strategic abilities as well. For
example, Jane's International Defense Review reports that NATO military
readiness has slipped so markedly since Desert Storm that the alliance
can only mobilize 2% of its fighting forces in the first twelve hours of a
crisis compared to the 70% figure during the Cold War.10 The decline in
military readiness is so dramatic that, given even a year to mobilize,
NATO could still field 10% fewer forces than those it could mobilize in
half a day in 1989.11
Given these alarming reports, an examination of the new military
policies of the United States would seem in order. Though no article
could possibly hope to explore all of the vast changes that the armed
forces have seen in the 1990's, a few of the changes stand out for their
significant impact on the fundamental role of the military. This article
explores some of those noteworthy changes, examines the impact they
have had on the men and women of the military and the American
public in general, and conjectures on the political reasons behind the
changes. Part II begins with an examination of the increasing use of the
military for domestic purposes such as drug interdiction and border
patrol. 12 Part I examines the new missions faced by the military
7

James Webb, Address at the Naval Institute's 122nd Annual Meeting and Sixth Annapolis
Seminar (Apr. 25, 1996).
8 See id.
9See id.
10See Holger Jensen, Expanded NATO a Clumsy Monster, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 25,
1997, at 57A.
"See id. Ironically, despite the dire statistics and commentary on morale and readiness, the
military seems to be riding a high when it comes to public respect. See infra note 326 and
accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 15 to 127 and accompanying text.
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overseas, particularly as a participant in NATO and the United
Nations.13 Part IV examines the broad new social policies that the armed
forces have been required to implement, specifically the integration of
women and homosexuals within the ranks. 14 Having examined these
changes, this article concludes that the nation still appears to be
searching for an appropriate post-Cold War mission for its armed forces,
with potentially dire consequences for the future.
I. THE INCREASING USE OF THE MILTARY FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES
A.

Civilian Control of the Militaryand the Posse Comitatus Act

"Civilian rule is basic to our system of government." Is The
subordination of the military to the civilian authorities is an AngloAmerican tradition that stretches back to the Magna Carta of 1215.16
Indeed, the strong interest in limiting military involvement in civilian
affairs was recognized in the Declaration of Independence, which stated
among its reasons for seeking liberty from Great Britain that the King
"has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the
Civil power."17 Though the Constitution does not contain an explicit
provision addressing the use of the military for domestic purposes,18 the
Founding Fathers mandated civilian control of the military in the Federal
Constitution through the government structure. 19 The Supreme Court
has recognized this concept in its decisions as well. 20 General Douglas
MacArthur's defiance of administration policy and President Truman's
unceremonious sacking of the General during the Korean War silenced
any further doubts about this tradition of civilian control of the
21
military.

13See infra notes 128 to 251 and accompanying text.

14See infra notes 252 to 324 and accompanying text.
IsSTEPHEN DYcus ET AL., NATIONAL SEcuRITY LAw 589 (2d ed. 1997).

16See Roger Blake Hohnsbeen, Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on
Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement, 54 GEo. WASH. L.REV. 404,404-05 (1986).
17THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776); see also DYCUS ET AL., supranote
15, at 589.
18See John P. Coffey, The Navy's Role in Interdicting NarcoticsTraffic: War on Drugs or Ambush
on the Constitution?,75 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1951 (1987).
19See Matthew Carlton Hammond, The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principlein Need of Renewal,
75 WASH. U.L.Q. 953,958 (1997).
20See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("The purpose of lodging dual titles in one man was to insure that the civilian
would control the military, not to enable the military to subordinate the presidential

office.").
21 See Dunlap, supra note 6, at 346; JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBIIJTY:
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Despite this tradition, the government has used the military for
domestic purposes as early as 1794 when President Washington called
out the militia to quell the Whiskey Rebellion. 22 In the ensuing years,
troops have been periodically called to keep the peace, to provide
humanitarian assistance to local communities, and to enforce the civilian
laws. 23 Early acts of Congress supported the use of the military for law
enforcement, 24 and public fear of the power of the military seemed to
wane in the years between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars. 25 The mid1800's, however, saw a resurrection of the traditional fear of oppressive
military power. One catalyst for this renewed apprehension was the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which allowed federal marshals to call on a
posse comitatus 26 to aid in returning slaves to their owners. 27 After its
passage, the Attorney General issued an advisory opinion that defined
posse comitatus to include use of the military. 28
During the
Reconstruction era, the use of the military in Southern states heightened
the public distaste for the use of troops in pursuing domestic duties. 29 In
the most extreme example, President Grant had authorized the use of
federal troops as a posse comitatus to police polling stations in the
South.3° Allegedly, troops were used to influence the outcome of the
1876 presidential election. 31 Abuse of the military in these situationssome of the most central to a democracy-cried out for a statutory
solution. 32
Congress formulated a solution to the growing public concern by
passing the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878. 33 Updated in 1956 to include
the Air Force as part of its coverage, 34 the Act now states the following:

CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 11 (1993).

2 See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 587.
23See id.
24See id. at 593.
25See Hammond, supra note 19, at 959.
26"The term 'posse comitatus' ('power of the county') denotes a sheriff's common law
authority to command the assistance of able-bodied citizens in order to enforce the. law."
Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Construction and Application of Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. §
1385), and Similar PredecessorProvisions, Restricting the Use of United States Army and Air
Force to Execute Laws, 141 A.L.R. FED. 271 (1997).
27See Hammond, supranote 19, at 959-60.
28See id. at 960.
29See id.

3 See id. at 960-61.
31See DYCus ET AL, supranote 15, at 593.
32See id.; Hammond, supra note 19, at 961.
" See DYCUS ET AL., supranote 15, at 593; Hammond, supra note 19, at 961.
3 See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of
Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.35

The Posse Comitatus Act embodies the traditional separation of the
military and civilian spheres. 36 Accordingly, its intent is to restrict the
direct and active use of the military for civilian law enforcement
purposes. 37 A few caveats are in order when discussing the Act,
however. First, it only refers by direct reference to the Army and Air
Force, and some courts have been reluctant to apply it to the sea
services. 38 However, Navy regulations have long applied the underlying
principles to forbid the use of Navy and Marine Corps assets as a posse
39
comitatus, but only as a matter of Department of Defense policy.
Moreover, because the Act was not intended to limit the use of state
militias, National Guard forces are not subject to the strictures of the Act
while remaining under state control. 40
Despite its nature as a criminal statute, no reported court cases
involving criminal prosecution of a person for violating the Posse
Comitatus Act exist. 41 In addition, the Act provides no private right of
action.42 Instead, defendants, including the government itself, have
43
raised alleged violations of the Act as defenses in court proceedings.
From these proceedings, two clear procedural rules have emerged. First,
the decisions have uniformly held that a violation of the Act by the
government does not erase the trial court's jurisdiction over the person
- 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994).
36 See Hammond, supra note 19, at 953.
37 See CHARLES A. SHANOR & L. LYNN HOGUE, MILITARY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 37 (1996).
38 See, e.g., Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1093 ("Nothing in [the legislative] history suggests that we

should defy the express language of the Posse Comitatus Act by extending it to the Navy,
as we decline to do so.") One commentator argues, however, that "[clourts have generally
construed the Act to apply to all of the services." Coffey, supra note 18, at 1955.
39 See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 597.

40 See id. at 599; Hammond, supra note 19, at 964. Congress has explicitly approved the use
of National Guard units for "drug interdiction and counter-drug activities" as long as they
remain under state control. DYCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 599-600 (citing 32 U.S.C. § 112
(1994); United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787 (D. Or. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 37
F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20 (3d Cir. 1993)).
41 See DYcus Er AL., supra note 15, at 595; SHANOR & HOGUE, supra note 37, at 37;
Hohnsbeen, supra note 16, at 408.
42See Porto, supra note 26.
43 See Hohnsbeen, supra note 16, at 408.
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or the crimes alleged. 44 Secondly, the exclusionary rule (barring
introduction of evidence seized) does not apply when there has been a
violation of the Act.45

Perhaps surprising in light of the concerns that gave rise to it, there
are many exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. First, as previously
stated, the Act was meant to limit only direct and active use of troopsthat is, actions of a "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory" nature-for
civilian law enforcement. 46 In other words, the indirect use of military
assets, such as providing advice to civilian law enforcement officials and
loaning military equipment to the police, would appear to be inherently
acceptable. 47 Other forms of indirect assistance that have not been held
to violate the Act include the use of Air Force assets to fly surveillance
missions for civilian law enforcement and military officers' advice in
quelling civilian disorders.48 Even the direct and active use of troops is
allowed in some circumstances under constitutional, statutory, and
common law exceptions. As one authoritative source explains, "[t]he
constitutional exceptions are (1) emergency authority to prevent loss of
life or property destruction and (2) authority to protect federal property
and functions when 'duly constituted local authorities are unable' to
provide adequate protection." 49 Many statutory exemptions allow the
" See id.
45
See Porto, supra note 26. At least one commentator takes issue with this rule, arguing that
"courts should exclude evidence obtained in violation, be it outright or constructive, of the
various prohibitions against civil law enforcement by military personnel." Coffey, supra
note 18, at 1950. In a final interesting comment on the litigation rules, Professors Shanor
and Hogue note that "[a]n unresolved issue with respect to the Posse Comitatus Act is
whether it applies outside the nation's borders .... The question arose in the trial of
Panamanian military leader Manuel Noriega but was not resolved." SHANOR & HOGUE,
supra note 37, at 40 (citing United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(motions to dismiss based on alleged violations of the Posse Comitatus Act withdrawn)).
46
Porto, supra note 26; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text. Porto further defines
direct and active participation to include situations where military personnel make arrests,
engage in search and/or seizure, investigate crimes, interview witnesses, and pursue
escaped prisoners. See Porto, supra note 26. For an up-to-date and comprehensive
summary of court cases where actions were found to be direct and active (and therefore
violative of the Posse Comitatus Act), see id.
4

See SHANOR & HOGUE, supra note 37, at 37; Porto, supra note 26.

48 See

United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 970 (1977). For a very recent and comprehensive summary of court cases finding that
actions were sufficiently passive to pass muster under the Posse Comitatus Act, see Porto,
supranote 26. In recent years, Congress has added statutory backing to many indirect uses
of military forces for domestic purposes, such as drug interdiction, border patrol, and tariff
law enforcement. SHANOR & HOGUE, supra note 37, at 39 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-380).
These new provisions will be discussed in greater details in the sections to follow.
49SHANOR & HoGuE, supra note 37, at 38 (citing 32 C.F.R. § 215.4).
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direct use of troops for domestic purposes as well. Three of these
involve the use of federal troops for the suppression of civilian
insurrection. 5° A fourth statutory exception not only allows but also
specifically requires that the military, upon request from the Secret
Service, assist it in carrying out its duties to protect political figures and
candidates from physical harm.51 The common law exceptions are twofold: (1) No violation of the Act occurs when military personnel assist
civilian police on their own initiative as private citizens; and (2) No
violation occurs when military personnel assist civilian police "to
achieve a military purpose and only incidentally enhance civilian law
enforcement," such as protecting people on a military base from fleeing
52
felons or investigating drug dealing by military personnel.
For almost 100 years following its passage, the Posse Comitatus Act
was rarely a topic of discussion in the judicial system, prompting one
court to describe it as "obscure and all-but-forgotten."5 3 Two unrelated
events in the 1970's-the armed occupation of the Indian village of
Wounded Knee by members of the American Indian Movement and the
illegal possession and sale of military weapons in the civilian
community-resulted in the use of federal troops to assist civilian police,
and the Act suddenly became a hot topic once more. 54 Interest in the Act
rose in the 1980's, as the nation began to view the military as a potential
asset in the famous "war on drugs" and reached a crescendo in the
1990's with the search for new post-Cold War roles for the military, as
the following sections will discuss. 55
B.

The IncreasedDomestic Roles of the Military in the 1990's
1.

The "War on Drugs"

By 1981, Congress had grown deeply concerned about the nation's
growing drug problems and began to turn to the military as a potential
solution.5 6 As a result, in that year Congress created a statutory
exception to the Posse Comitatus Act to direct the use of the military for
drug interdiction efforts on the nation's borders. 57 These amendments
gave the military limited authority to provide, operate, or maintain

- See id. (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335).
51See id. at 39 (citing H.J.R. 1292, June 6, 1968, P.L. 90-331, 82 Stat. 170).
52Porto, supra note 26.
5 Id. (quoting Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918,
reh. denied 336 U.S. 947 (1949)).
5 See id.
- See infra notes 56 to 127.
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equipment and to furnish information, advice, training, and facilities for
civilian law enforcement officials involved in enforcing the federal drug
laws.5 8 However, the amendments also barred the direct use of military
personnel for search, seizure, or arrest, and even indirect assistance if it
would impair military readiness.5 9
The 1981 amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act have arguably
made enforcement of the nation's drug laws more effective. 6° However,
they faced tough opposition both within Congress and from outside
influences, 61 including such unlikely partners as the Department of
Defense itself, criminal defense lawyers, and civil libertarians. 62 A quick
look at one specific incident involving these amendments may illustrate
the critics' concerns. Pursuant to the 1981 amendments, the Navy began
embarking small teams of Coast Guard Tactical Enforcement Teams
(TACLETs) on board its warships that patrolled known drug smuggling
areas. 63 On July 14, 1983, one such team aboard the Navy destroyer USS
KIDD (DDG 993) sighted a suspicious fishing boat. When the boat
refused a request by the Coast Guard officers to stop, the KIDD checked
64
the registry of the vessel and found that the registry was fraudulent.
The KIDD then ordered the boat to stop. When the boat refused to do
so--in an amazing turn of events in naval history--the commanding
officer of the destroyer ordered the raising of the Coast Guard ensign
(essentially declaring the ship a Coast Guard law enforcement asset
rather than a Navy warship) and gave chase. 65 After firing warning
shots (which were ignored), the KIDD fired directly at the fishing boat,
disabling it and allowing the TACLET team to board. 66 The TACLET
team subsequently found almost 900 bales of marijuana aboard the
fishing boat, and the crewmembers were later prosecuted in federal
court. 67 Incidents such as this prompted one observer in the mid-1980's

-1

See Hohnsbeen, supra note 16, at 416.

57Hammond,

supra note 19, at 954; Dycus ET AL., supra note 15, at 598 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§
371-381 (1994)); Hohnsbeen, supra note 16, at 417-18. The amendments also allowed the
Department of Defense to assist in enforcement of immigration and tariff laws. DYcUS ET
AL., supranote 15, at 598 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-381 (1994)).
5' See Hohnsbeen, supranote 16, at 417-18.

-9See 10 U.S.C. §§ 375-376 (1994).
61 See Hohnsbeen, supra note 16, at 419.
"1See id. at 420.
62See id.
63See Coffey, supranote 18, at 1949; see also 10 U.S.C.§ 379 (1994).
6See Coffey, supra note 18, at 1949.
65 See id.
See id.

67See id. at 1949-50.
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to comment that "[t]he 1981 amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act
portend an increased military role in civil law enforcement." 68 Time
would prove him right.
Since the late 1980's and the diminishment of the Soviet threat, the
legislative and executive branches have repeatedly expanded the
military's role in the enforcement of drug laws, going so far as adopting
the militaristic term "war on drugs" to describe the national effort. 69 By
1989, Congress had even designated the Department of Defense as the
"single lead agency" in the nation's drug interdiction efforts.7 0 In 1994,
Congress firmly tied the drug issue to national security, thus formally
legitimizing the use of the military in drug interdiction efforts, by
enacting a statute with the following language: "Personnel of the
Department of Defense may not be detailed to another department or
agency in order to implement the National Drug Control Strategy unless
the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that the detail of such
71
personnel is in the national security interest of the United States."
This new linkage prompted one military officer to observe with
concern that "[giranting the military the responsibility for the general
national welfare under the aegis of 'national security' is a major
expansion of its customary function."72 Still, the drive to use the military
in ever-increasing drug law enforcement roles continues. There have
even been proposals to use military troops to patrol neighborhoods in
Washington, D.C. in an effort to stop drug trafficking. 73 The expanded
military role became so pervasive by the mid 1990's that the Department
of Defense had begun to establish entire military units dedicated solely
to drug interdiction. One example can be found at Naval Air Station
Atlanta. On November 18, 1995, for the first time in its history, the Navy
commissioned a unit, Airborne Early Warning Squadron 77 (VAW-77),
whose entire mission is to fight the war on drugs. 74 Instead of training to
fly its E-2C reconnaissance planes from the decks of aircraft carriers, this
new Atlanta-based squadron will patrol the waters of the Caribbean
6 Hohnsbeen, supra note 16, at 425.
6 See DYcus Er AL., supra note 15, at 598.
70See Hammond, supra note 19, at 954.
71Dycus Er AL., supra note 15, at 599 (citing Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 1011(c), 108 Stat. 2836

(1994)).
72Dunlap, supra note 6, at 357.
73See DYCUS ET AL., supranote 15, at 600.
74
See Luke Johnson, NAS Atlanta Gets Drug-FightingSquadron, MARIETTA DAILY J., Nov. 19,
1995, at 1C; Doug Payne, New Unit to Boost Area Military Base, ATLANTA J. & CONsT., Nov.
16, 1995 ("Cobb Extra"section, at G19). The author of this paper participated in the
commissioning of VAW-77.
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looking for drug runners, a tremendous diversion of resources to law
enforcement efforts. 75
2.

Border Patrol, Battling Domestic Terrorism, and Other New
Missions

When Congress modified the Posse Comitatus Act in 1981, it gave
permission for the indirect use of the military for purposes beyond drug
interdiction, such as enforcement of the immigration and tariff laws. 76
Responding to this new role, the Department of Defense established Joint
Task Force 6 (JTF-6) in 1989.77 JTF-6 coordinates activities between
military and law enforcement agencies along the 2,000-mile Mexican
border.78 Since its inception, JTF-6 has been involved in more than 3,000
separate missions, a clear sign of the expanding role of the military in
this effort.79
In the years following the 1981 amendments, Congress considered
legislation that would directly involve troops in enforcing customs and
immigration laws at the nation's borders.80 By 1996, these calls had
reached such a point that presidential candidate Lamar Alexander ran on
a platform calling for the creation of a new branch of the armed forces
that would replace the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Border Patrol.81
The line between direct and indirect actions can sometimes be
blurred, however, as one tragic incident illustrates. The concerns of
critics of the use of military personnel along the border came into sharp
focus in May, 1997, when Marines on patrol in Texas shot and killed an
eighteen-year old. 82 The Marines, operating under the direction of JTF-6,
were conducting a clandestine mission along the Mexican border looking
for smugglers when they encountered Esequiel Hernandez as he herded
his family's goats.83 The Marine corporal who fired the fatal shot said
75See Johnson, supra note 74; Payne, supra note 74. The expanding role of the military in
drug interdiction was a hot topic in the 1996 presidential election, when candidate Bob
Dole pledged to increase the use of the military in the war on drugs. See Hammond, supra
note 19, at 954.
76
See supra note 57.
7 See Martz, supra note 2, at GI.
7 See id.
71See id.
0 See Hammond, supra note 19, at 953-54 (citing Border Integrity Act, H.R. 1224, 104th
Cong.)(1995).
81See id. at 954.
8 See Martz, supra note 2.
83See id.
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that he fired in self-defense after Hernandez shot at the camouflaged
military patrol. 4
Although JTF-6 troops have been involved in other shooting
incidents, Hernandez was the first U.S. citizen killed in this ongoing roll.
As a result, the incident raised alarm among some observers.85 For
example, author Timothy Dunn remarked that this case "starkly
illustrates the difference between a military approach to the problem and
a law enforcement approach to the problem." 6 Maria Jimenez of the
Immigration Law Enforcement Project was even more to the point,
saying, "In a democracy, the military should have a limited role, and that
role should be fighting foreign enemies. This is not a life-threatening
situation that would warrant military action."87 Even the Department of
Defense seemed worried as a result of this shooting. The Department's
temporary suspension of ground patrols along the border, while still
providing more traditional indirect help such as air reconnaissance
88
through JTF-6, illustrates this concern.
Notwithstanding the Hernandez incident, Congress continues to
expand the use of military troops for border patrol. In June, 1997, it
passed a measure written by Representative James Traficant (D-Ohio)
that authorizes the use of up to 10,000 military personnel along the
border; it reaffirmed the measure in September, 1997.89
The year 1993 ushered in a new potential domestic role for the
military. At lunchtime on February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in the
parking garage beneath the World Trade Center, "immeasurably
harm[ing] America's notions of security from terrorism." 9° Two years
later a truck bomb planted by Timothy McVeigh leveled the federal
building in downtown Oklahoma City, shattering any remaining sense
of security from terrorism that Americans had. 91 The sabotage of an
Amtrak passenger train in Arizona soon followed the Oklahoma City

84See id.
See id. Apparently believing the corporal, however, a grand jury refused to indict any of
the Marines. See id.
86Martz, supra note 2.
87Id.

m8See id. Helicopters from Marine Aircraft Group 42, based at Naval Air Station Atlanta,
have participated in these reconnaissance flights along the border. See id.
8

9 See id.

supra note 15, at 671.
91See generally id. at 672-73.
90DYCUS Er AL.,
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bombing. 92 All of these incidents illustrated to Americans the danger
93
from terrorist attacks that originate within the United States.
Although the United States had long had statutes dealing with such
threats, 94 Americans called for military intervention. Within one week of
the Oklahoma City bombing, for example, President Clinton proposed
an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act that would have allowed the
military to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in cases involving
"weapons of mass destruction."95 The exception would have been
codified in the Counterterrorism Act of 1995.96 However, Congress
deleted this exception to ensure the passage of the Counterterrorism Act
against some heady opposition in the House of Representatives. 97 Still,
one commentator asked, "Should military troops be used in responding
to a terrorist threat, either at home or abroad" and "Should we be
prepared to subject such defendants to military trials?" 98 These incidents
of terrorism and the subsequent legislative proposal by President
Clinton paved the path for greater military involvement.
Lacking clear direction on its role in combating domestic terrorism,
the Department of Defense has attempted to delineate the parameters of
military involvement in this effort. Specifically, a 1994 Department
directive addresses terrorism and other civil disturbances. 99 It states that
the president can order the deployment of troops in such emergencies
but allows their deployment without presidential authority when
necessary to "prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property, or to
restore government functioning and public order." 1° °
The same
directive, however, states that the Attorney General maintains his duty
of directing federal response to acts of domestic terrorism and mandates
that any troops used "remain under military command and control at all
times." 10 1 Using these and other guidelines, the government has
9See

id. at 604.

9See id. at 604.
9 For example,

the Civil Obedience Act, passed at the height of Vietnam War protests in
1968, provided punishment for anyone who: "teaches or demonstrates to any other person
the use, application, or making of any firearm or explosive device, or technique capable of
causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending that the
same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder....
18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1994).
95See Hammond, supranote 19, at 953.
9
6See id. at 953 n. 6,972.
9 See Hammond, supra note 19, at 953 n.6.
98 DYCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 605.
See id. at 606.
140DOD Dir. 3025.12 (Feb. 4, 1994), at 4.
1MId.
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deployed military troops in several recent situations to counter potential
10 2
domestic terrorism; the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta is a prime example.
Congress has not limited the expanding domestic role of the military
to traditional police work.10 3 For example, the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1993 allows the use of the military for a wide range
of activities that were once the exclusive job of local civilian authorities.
The Act sets up the Civil-Military Cooperative Action Program to use the
"skills, capabilities, and resources of the armed forces to assist civilian
efforts to meet the needs of the United States." 1°4 As a result, the military
now lends its services to local schools and youth projects, provides
medical care and conducts repair projects in local communities, provides
greater humanitarian relief after natural disasters, and engages in
10 5
environmental restoration, among many other civilian endeavors.
C.

Why the Expanding Domestic Role is Questionable

The preceding examples illustrate that the once-distinct line
between the military and civilian spheres has blurred over the past few
years, particularly since the demise of the Cold War. 10 6 A series of
decisions by the executive and legislative branches have greatly
expanded the exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, clearly allowing
greater use of the armed forces for domestic purposes. 10 7 In short, both

102The author of this paper was one of the military members who participated in the joint
task force set up for the 1996 Olympics. Approximately 13,000 troops were deployed for
the Olympics at a cost to taxpayers of $51 million, with the threat of terrorism as one of the
motivating factors. See John J. Fialka, Join the Army to See the World; Drive Athletes Around
Atlanta, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1996, at B1. However, not all of the troops were used for
security purposes; some were used for such mundane tasks as watering field-hockey
arenas and driving buses, which led Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) to call the assignments
"demeaning and degrading" to the troops. Id.; see also Business, Capitol Hill Question
Military's Role in Olympics, DEFENSE WEEK, July 22, 1996. Newspaper editorials around the
nation were generally very critical of the role played by the military at the 1996 Olympics.
See, e.g., Atlanta Storm, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATcH, June 24, 1996, at A6; Olympic Personnel
Carriers,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 23,1996, at 14A.
I11See Dunlap, supra note 6, at 359.
104Id. at 359-60 & n.136 (quoting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1983, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10
U.S.C. §§113-2825 (1988)).
105See id. at 360. See Appendix I for a list of major relief projects the Department of Defense
has participated in. For an in-depth discussion of one particular project, the provision of
medical services to international athletes at the 1996 Paralympic Games in Atlanta, see
LCDR W. Kent Davis et al., Atlanta Medical Reservists Help Host the World, NAVY MEDICINE,
March-April 1997, at 2.
"06 See Martz, supra note 2; Hammond, supra note 19, at 955.
107See Martz, supra note 2; Hammond, supranote 19, at 955.
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the government and the public have come to see the military as a
panacea for the nation's problems, consequently shifting many functions
to military control. 08 Several observers-both within the military and
among civilians - have speculated that the armed forces have eagerly
embraced the new domestic roles as a means of preserving force
structure and improving public relations. 10 9 The problem with these
expanded duties, however, is that they fail "to preserve that necessary
and traditional separation of civilian and military authority" and
"undermine civilian control of the military, damage military readiness,
and inefficiently solve the problems that they supposedly address."" 0
Nowhere are these dangers more prevalent than in the use of the
military for civilian law enforcement. Civilian supremacy over the
military rests on the assumption that organization and maintenance of
the military is separate from the local and more decentralized police
forces of the nation."' The paramount reason for the separation of these
two entities is their fundamentally different roles and missions, resulting
in distinct training methods. 112 Police officers must recognize individual
rights and seek to protect those rights.1 3 Prior to using force, police
officers must try to de-escalate a situation, and they draw their weapons
only when prepared to use them." 4 On the other hand, members of the
armed forces are trained to carry out the external mission of defending
the nation." 5 In doing so, troops do not focus on individual rights and
may use deadly force without any prior aggression by the target." 6 The
traditional separation of the military and police forces warranted by
these differing roles, however, is being steadily eroded by the growing
exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, which could prove to have dire
consequences." 7 The most dangerous consequence is that using the
military to seize civilians can expose civilian government to the threat of
military rule and the suspension of constitutional liberties. As an Air
Force officer has warned, "[t]he military's elevated standing, combined
with other circumstances of the contemporary political landscape, invites
an unprecedented insinuation of the military into American life," a
169See Hammond, supranote 19, at 953.
1(9See, e.g., Dunlap, supranote 6, at 361; Hammond, supranote 19, at 976.

Hammond, supranote 19, at 953, 955.
See Dunlap, supra note 6, at 359.
112See Hammond, supra note 19, at 973.
10
I

13 See
114See
11sSee
116See
117See

id.
id.
id.

id.
id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [1998], Art. 5

76

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33

situation which "challenges civilian control of the [military]."11 8 This
danger is even more ominous when one considers that the peacetime
military forces performing domestic duties before the Cold War were
very small compared to the rest of American society, a situation that is
very different today.11 9
Undoubtedly, military involvement in the domestic sphere produces
some benefits to pressing domestic problems.120 The need to fight the
war on drugs, to deter illegal immigration and smuggling, and to combat
domestic terrorism, however, are all serious problems that will only
disappear with long-term social solutions.121 Austere budgets and the
public desire for a quick-fix do not warrant the emergency use of the
military in a nontraditional and dangerous role. 122 The Supreme Court
recognized this when it said "[e]mergency does not create power.
Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the
restrictions placed upon power granted or reserved." 123 Delegating
domestic duties to the military under the guise of an emergency can pose
risks not only to individual liberty, but also to the history and the
underlying structure of the United States. 124 So far, Congress and the
President have shown little interest in stemming the transfer of domestic
duties to the military.125 If the trend continues, however, the courts will
inevitably have to restore the traditional subordination of the military to
civilian control.1 26 Even the intervention of the courts might not be
enough in the end, however. No better closing commentary can be made
on this ultimate danger than the words of Colonel Charles J. Dunlap:

118Dunlap, supra note 6, at 342, 357.
'1

See id. at 361.

120See Hohnsbeen, supranote 16, at 433.

121
See Hammond, supranote 19, at 984.
122See id.

123Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934). Contrast this with
Abraham Lincoln's view of the effect that emergencies can have on the ability to expand
certain government powers:
By general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must
be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a
limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional, might become
lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the
constitution, through the preservation of the nation.
DYCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 89-90 (quoting Letter to Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in
VII Collected Works 281 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1953-55)) (justifying Lincoln's issuance of the
Emancipation Proclamation under questionable legal grounds).
124See Hammond, supra note 19, at 984; Hohnsbeen, supranote 16, at 433.
12 See Coffey, supra note 18, at 1966.
126See id.
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In the final analysis, it is the American people who must
make some hard decisions about the kind of nation in
which they wish to live. If they continue to turn to the
military for answers, if they abandon their attachment to
the democratic process, if they fail to take the necessary
action to reinvigorate civilian control, if they persist in
exalting inflated notions of security over all other human
values, then they will get, as it is often said, the
government they deserve ....[J]ust as the military can
keep a nation free, it can, without effective civilian
1 27
control, enslave a nation as well.
III. THE SHIFTING WINDS OF MILITARY ALLIANCES AND NEW MISSIONS
OVERSEAS

A.

The New NATO

Changes in U.S. military policy have not been limited to the
domestic sphere by any means. In the 1990's, changing international
alliances have created new missions for the armed forces overseas.
American participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has established many of these new roles. NATO originated in
the years after World War II as a bulwark against perceived Soviet
aggression in Europe. 128 Several of the World War II allies-Britain,
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg-took tentative
steps toward NATO when they signed the Brussels Treaty of 1948 to
protect against the possibility of a renewed threat from the East.129 At
the same time, Britain pushed for a treaty commitment from the United
States to protect Western Europe.13° These efforts culminated in the
signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. on April 4,
1949, a few months before the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic
bomb.131 The United States Congress ratified the treaty and it became
effective on August 24, 1949.132 Under the treaty, the controlling
127Dunlap, supra note

6, at 390, 392.
Jane E. Stromseth, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Security After
the Cold War, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 479, 480 (1991); James T. Wilson, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), in 17 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 607 (1990).
129See Stromseth, supra note 128.
130 See id.
131See id.; see also Wilson, supra note 128.
132See DYcus ET AL., supra note 15, at 294; Wilson, supra note 128. The Constitution deems
treaties, along with the Constitution itself and the federal laws, to be "the Supreme Law of
the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI. Our first Chief Justice clearly recognized the importance of
treaties and other forms of international law when he asserted that "the laws of the land
128See
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authority of NATO is the North Atlantic Council, a body of civilian
representatives from the member states which meets at least once a week
in Brussels, Belgium. 1' The Council held its first session on September
17, 1949.1M
The most important obligation of the NATO treaty is embodied in
Article 5, which deems that "an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all" and requires that each member nation will take "individually
and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of
the North Atlantic area."135 Other provisions of the treaty encourage
expansion of the size, mission, and outreach of NATO. For example,
Article 2 states that "[t]he Parties will contribute toward the further
development of peaceful and friendly international relations by
strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are
founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being." 136
Another provision provides that NATO can, by unanimous vote, "invite
any other European state in a position to further the principles of this
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to
accede to this Treaty." 13 7
Prior to the 1990's, NATO had taken a few steps to meet its outreach
objectives. For example, having started with twelve members, 138 NATO
subsequently expanded by adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, West

admit of being classed under the three heads of descriptions. 1st. All treaties made under
the authority of the United States. 2d. The laws of nations. 3d. The constitution, and
statutes of the United States." DYCUS Er AL, supra note 15, at 180 (quoting Trial of Gideon
Henfield (C.C.D. Pa. 1793 (charge to the grand jury by C.J. Jay), reprinted in Wharton, State
Trials
49,52-53 (1849)).
33
' See Wilson, supra note 128.
134

135

See id.

Stromseth, supra note 128, at 481. To ensure the ability to meet this commitment, Article
3 pledges all parties to develop their "individual and collective capacity to resist armed
attack" through "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." Id.
136 Id.

at 481-82. The NATO treaty has other provisions relevant to the discussion here. For
instance, it encourages (but does not require) joint action in response to out-of-area
contingencies (such as Iraq), provides for consultation and review of the treaty in response
to changes in European security (such as the end of the Cold War), and provides for the
development of other institutions designed to maintain peace and security. See id. at 502.
138The original members were the United States, Canada, Iceland, Great Britain, France,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Italy, Norway, and Denmark. See
Wilson, supra note 128.
137Id.
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Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.139 A reunified Germany replaced
West Germany as a NATO member in 1990.140 The end of the Cold War
in the early 1990's, however, firmly pushed NATO to expand its
outreach obligations. 141 With fear of the Soviet response diminished, the
alliance announced its readiness to undertake peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions in 1992.142 In short order, NATO forces began
monitoring the compliance of merchant ships with regard to a United
Nations trade embargo against Serbia and Montenegro for their support
of "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 143 Later, NATO undertook
its first combat actions in history when its forces downed Serbian
warplanes and bombed Serbian troop positions.144
In addition to these expanded missions, NATO began to reach out to
its former Cold War adversaries. For example, in the mid-1990's, it
established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which offered a
restricted associate membership to European countries outside the
alliance, including Russia. 145 To further the PfP program, selected NATO
members even went so far as to establish a school in Garmisch,
Germany, the George C. Marshall European Center Security Studies,
with a mission of assisting PfP "developing nations establish national
security structures and supporting institutions which are compatible
with democratic principles and processes and civilian oversight of the
military, and market economies." 146 The classes offered by the Marshall
Center quickly became busy with "executive military and civilian
personnel" from nations such as Latvia, Russia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Romania, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Bulgaria attending the training
offered. 147 NATO and PfP nations have even begun conducting military
139See id.; Stromseth, supra note 128, at 482.
140See Wilson, supra note 128.
141See Gail Garfinkil Weiss, Redefining the Alliance's Mission, COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA CD-

ROM (1996).
142See id.
143See id.
144See id.
145See id. Even non-Soviet bloc countries, such as Austria, were offered membership in the

Partnership For Peace Program. See id.
146The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Homepage (visited May
18, 1998) <http://www.marshall.adsn.int/marshall.html>; see also Letter and enclosures
from Mari K. Eder, Public Affairs Officer, George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies, to W. Kent Davis (Dec. 11, 1997) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Letter].
147
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Homepage, supra note 146;
see also Letter, supra note 146. Apparently, the Marshall Center has fared much better in its
public relations efforts than another school-the School of the Americas at Fort Benning,
Georgia-with a similar mission aimed at Latin America. While most Americans have
never even heard of the Marshall Center and would likely applaud its efforts if they had,
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training together in the field, 148 with NATO members providing
instruction on topics as diverse as military tactics and how armed forces
1 49
deal with journalists in a democratic society.
Several Eastern European nations--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic--applied for full admission to the alliance, 15° which caused
turmoil in U.S. political circles and among NATO members.1 51 For
example, President Bush, and initially President Clinton, largely ignored
the applications, but Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, seeing a
potential political boost among ethnic voters in big city enclaves,
supported the applications and made NATO expansion a part of the
Republican platform in 1994 and 1996.152 Despite these platforms, a
fellow Republican member of Congress, Senator John Warner, was less
enthusiastic, questioning the wisdom of expanding NATO and urging a
moratorium on additional nations joining the alliance if NATO extended
an invitation for membership to these three countries.15 3 President
Clinton eventually reversed his course and supported the applications of
the three nations by arguing to Congress in early 1997 that "[i]nclusion
of new members into NATO's ranks is an indispensable element of a
broader American strategy to create an undivided, democratic Europe
for the 21st century." 154 The President began to lobby hard for the

the School of the Americas has become extremely controversial. See, e.g., Gail Corcoran
Freundt, Editorial: Shut Down School of Americas, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 27, 1998, at
A17; Army School Meets with Religious Group, MARIETTA DAILY J., May 3, 1998, at 6B.
Approximately 300 of the 60,000 graduates of the School of the Americas have been
accused by activists of human rights abuses in Latin America. See Army School Meets with
Religious Group, supra. Perhaps the most infamous incident of this nature occurred in 1989,
when graduates of the School massacred six Jesuit priests and two female co-workers in El
Salvador. See Freundt, supra this note.
148 See Joris Janssen Lok, Dutch Forces Conduct Brigade-Level Exercise in Poland, JANE'S INT'L
DEFENSE REV., June 1997, at 17.
149 See LCDR Bob Kantor, Four PAOs Staff NATO/PfP Exercise in Eastern Europe, PACE
NEWSLETTER (Navy Office of Information, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1998, at 7.
150See William M. Burke, U.S. Defense Contractors Behind NATO Expansion Push, MARIETTA
DAILY J., Apr. 26, 1998, at 8B.
151See id.; Tom Gjelten and Bob Edwards, Iraq StrainingNATO Alliance, MORNING EDITION,
Feb. 13, 1998, (NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Feb. 13, 1998) (available in 1998 WL 3306375).
Gjelten and Edwards note, in comments on the possibility of the alliance's expansion, that
"NATO members ... are divided over how the alliance should be organized and how fast
it should grow." Id.
152See Burke, supra note 150.
153 See Gjelten and Edwards, supra note 151 (summarizing the concerns of Senator John
Warner (R-Va.)).
154Letter from President Bill Clinton to the Chairmen of the Senate Committees on Foreign
Relations and Armed Services and the House Committees on International Relations and
National Security, Feb. 24, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 5710988.
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expansion of NATO for the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs, ultimately
obtaining the reluctant support of the Pentagon and the unlikely backing
of such allies as Henry Kissinger when the necessary two-thirds Senate
vote was approaching in early 1998.155 Finally, on April 30, 1998, the
Senate voted 80-19 to approve adding the three new members to
NATO. 1 6 Meanwhile, other former Soviet bloc nations began to express
their interests in joining NATO, particularly the Baltic States and
Romania. 57 Almost a dozen other nations now have applied for
membership. 158
The expanding role of NATO clearly caused problems for its
members, especially the United States. The strains became clear in the
first few weeks of 1998 when NATO members became bitterly divided
on how to deal with new threats from the nation of Iraq, peacekeeping in
Bosnia, and membership expansion. 159 The most ominous of these
disputes involved the proposed expansion of NATO. Critics in the U.S.
began to mercilessly assail the possibility of membership by former
Soviet-bloc nations.
For example, George Kennan warned that
"[e]xpanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy
in the entire post cold war era." 60 And columnist William Burke
i

See Gjelten & Edwards, supranote 151; Burke, supra note 150.

56

1 See Tom Raum, Senate Approves NATO Expansion: Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland to Join

Alliance, DETRorr NEWS, May 1, 1998, at AS. Earlier in the day, the Senate rejected an
amendment by Senator Warner that would have imposed a three-year moratorium before
any further members were added, see id., clearing the way for other nations to apply for
NATO membership.
157See Taras Kuzio, The Baltics, Ukraine, and the Path to NATO, 9 JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV.
300 (1997); ENS Bill Murray & LCDR Phil McGuinn, Public Information Team Takes to the
Road in Romania, PACE NEWSLETTER (Navy Office of Information, Washington, D.C.), Nov.
1997, at 3. The prospects for the Baltic States joining NATO appear dim at present,
however. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry has dismissed the possibility as follows:
"The Baltic States are not ready to join NATO. These countries simply do not meet the
alliance's standards, which call for developed democracy, the absence of conflicts with
neighbours, market economies and armed forces capable of operating jointly with NATO."
Kuzio, supra this note, at 301. This sentiment seems to be shared among our NATO allies.
"With the exception of the Scandinavian countries, there is... a general pessimism among
other Western governments regarding the Baltic nations' future NATO membership." Id.
at 301. Romania, for its part, apparently believes that its prospects are good, and has
"invited 'advisors' from NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) Command to
instruct their senior Romanian military officers on the ways of the West." Murray and
McGuinn, supra this note. Other Eastern bloc nations have taken a more moderate stance.
Ukraine, for example, while regarding "NATO as a defensive alliance that poses no threat.
. has adopted a balanced foreign policy between [Russia] and the West" and thus has not
applied for NATO membership. Kuzio, supra this note, at 301-303.
158See Raum, supra note 156.
159See Gjelten & Edwards, supra note 151.
16 Burke, supra note 150.
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charged that the proposed expansion rather nefariously stemmed from
"the community of U.S. defense contractors, who have been struggling
with a defense budget 21 percent smaller than the Gulf War peak [and]
see a great opportunity to recoup their fortunes by outfitting all the
Central European armies with spanking new NATO equipment, even
while many U.S. units are operating with half rations." 161 In the wake of
these general criticisms, more specific reasons for not expanding NATO
began to appear in the U.S. These more exacting critiques have taken
three approaches: 1) NATO is obsolete and therefore unnecessary; 2)
NATO expansion would alienate Russia, causing even more problems
for the alliance; and 3) NATO expansion is prohibitively expensive. An
individual examination of these three criticisms is necessary.
1.

NATO Is Obsolete

As previously discussed, NATO's original purpose was to counter
the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Now that the Soviet Union
no longer exists, Professor Richard Anderson, among others, asks why
NATO is still necessary, stating that:
NATO is a classic example of success producing
obsolescence. The alliance that once shielded Europe
against the real threat of Soviet armies in Germany
protects against no real threat now that those armies
have retreated .... Russia today is also a democracy....
Not likely to make war against democratic neighbors,
democratic Russia has also just demonstrated in
authoritarian Chechnya its lack of the capability to pose
162
a military threat.
In addressing NATO's need to expand its role into areas such as the
PfP,the Bosnian conflict, and the standoff with Iraq, Professor Anderson
further observes that "[tihe historical record contradicts assertions that
Id.
Richard D. Anderson Jr., On the Wisdom of Enlarging NATO, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR,
AFF. 1, 9-11 (Spring/Summer 1997). Professor Anderson's optimism is not shared by
Richard Pipes, who states the following cautionary note: "It is impossible at this time to
foresee which path Russia will choose, pro-Western or anti-Western. The country's
political structures are too fragile and the mood of its people too volatile for predictions....
Is Russia still an enemy? It is not and it ought not to be. But it might become one... once
again." Pipes, supra note 5, at 65. Professor Perlmutter and Ted Carpenter are equally
pessimistic, noting that "Russia's political future is uncertain." Amos Perlmutter & Ted
Galen Carpenter, NATO's Expensive Trip East: The Folly of Enlargement, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Jan./Feb. 1997, at 2, 5.
161

16
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NATO prevents threats from arising, that NATO sustains democracy in
its member states, that European democracies need membership in
NATO to remain democratic, that NATO can deter regional leaders bent
on violence, or that there is any need to deter violent encounters between
63
states that elect their leaders."'
Given this state of affairs, argues Professor Anderson, expansion of
NATO "is just a diplomatic farce," stemming from "a standard
Democratic Party foreign policy of liberal internationalism that replicates
164
Thus,
in world affairs its liberal interventionism in domestic policy."
though he sees NATO expansion as holding little prospect of harm over
that
the short-term, even if it will result in no real gain, he concludes
5
it."16
dismantle
to
start
should
U.S.
the
"[aifter NATO enlarges,
Professor Jane Stromseth shares a similar, though more moderate
view. She tends to discount the relevance of NATO over the long run,
but also takes into account the short-term threat that Russia may not turn
out as many in the West hope:
The urgency of the Alliance's original military
purpose-to deter Soviet aggression against Western
Europe and to defend NATO territory in the event of an
attack-has receded dramatically with the demise of the
Warsaw Pact and the diminishing Soviet military
Even as NATO is
presence in Eastern Europe.
attempting to modify and pare down its military
objectives in light of changed circumstances, it is
struggling to define a meaningful political role for itself.
... To say that NATO is less relevant to the problems of
European security, however, is not to say that it is
In light of the Soviet Union's uncertain
irrelevant ....
political evolution, the transatlantic security link

163Anderson, supra note 162, at 11.

in
164Id. at 17, 22. Professor Anderson attributes the same enthusiasm for NATO expansion
other nations as also politically motivated: "[F]oreign policies are not motivated by their
international results.... When a leader offers a vision of social order, the leader can attract
additional supporters and provide additional reasons for support by incorporating into the
vision a grand strategy in world affairs .... In short, politicians in many countries make an
issue of NATO enlargement, even though it has no bearing on the real interests of their
citizens, because NATO enlargement is suitable for symbolic utterances that identify the
politicians with their citizens' common experience." Id. at 15, 21.
165Id. at 2, 23.
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provided by the Alliance will be important for many
166
years to come.

Both Anderson and Stromseth agree that NATO must eventually
become extinct. The timing of this extinction will depend on the threat
posed by Russia. Defining the continuing threat from Russia, however,
is still a difficult problem and is a troubling variable in both the push to
expand NATO and the argument that NATO is now obsolete.
2.

NATO Expansion Will Alienate Russia

Even if NATO still serves a purpose, the issue of expansion faces a
serious roadblock: the tenuous and still developing relationship between
the United States and Russia. The rhetoric of both nations suggests
friendly terms between NATO and Russia today. For example, the
military doctrine adopted by Russia in 1993 declares that it "does not
regard any state to be its adversary." 167 Moreover, President Clinton in
1997 declared that "[tihe enlargement of NATO is not directed against
any state; NATO does not see any nation as its enemy." 168 Despite these
hospitable words, the expansion of NATO has clearly created problems
in the relationship between Russia and the member states. Russian
leaders uniformly view NATO as an anti-Russian military alliance and
have protested the "growing threat" from NATO's enlargement. 169 The
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia publicly stated in 1997 that
"[p]lans to expand NATO presented Russia with serious problems" and
chastised NATO for "ignoring the concerns of Russia and of other
nations." 170 Russia has especially criticized the admission of specific
states to NATO, calling admission of the Baltic States completely
17
unacceptable and threatening "a rupture with the West if it happens." '
The Russians have found sympathetic voices in the United States, with
one commentator arguing that "[bly reneging on our implicit promise to
Stromseth, supra note 128, at 501-02.
Pipes, supra note 5, at 65.
168 Letter from President Bill Clinton to the Chairmen of the Senate Committees on Foreign
Relations and Armed Services and the House Committees on International Relations and
National Security, supra note 154.
169 Stephen Blank, Russia, NATO Enlargement,and the Baltic States, 160 WORLD AFF. 115, 120
(1998). Blank adds this chilling note on the Russian fears: "On January 22, 1997, the
Russian government released a letter from generals and admirals urging the retargeting of
European capitols with nuclear weapons should NATO expand." Id. at 124 n.61.
170Nikolai Afanasievskii, On the NATO-Russia Founding Act, 43 INT'L AFF. 158, 158-59 (Issue
166
167

4, 1997).

Blank, supra note 169, at 115. To be fair, the West also discourages inviting the Baltic
States to join NATO. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
171
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stay clear of Russia's frontiers, we have discredited the Russian
reformers who are trying to build a democratic, market-oriented society,
and have strengthened the nationalists who are embittered by the
Soviets' loss of superpower status. " 172
Attempting to alleviate these fears, NATO and Russia took a
dramatic step in 1997. On May 27, 1997, a formal ceremony took place in
the Palais Elysee for the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation, and Security between Russia and NATO. 173
Present at the ceremony were Russian President Yeltsin, the heads of
state of NATO countries, and the Secretary General of NATO. 174
Echoing the pre-Founding Act rhetoric of both sides, the document
includes a statement that Russia and NATO will no longer view each
other as enemies.17 5 More proactive language devotes "both sides to
long-term and equal partnership and cooperation, the refusal to use force
or the threat of force against one another, and respect for sovereignty,
76
independence, territorial integrity, and the indelibility of borders."
Other clauses promise cooperation on nuclear safety issues, joint military
operations, defense industry conversion, cooperative projects in defenserelated economic, environmental and scientific fields, improved air
traffic safety, and increased air traffic capacity. 177 Finally, the document
states, "Provisions of this act do not provide NATO or Russia, in any
way, with a right of veto over the actions of the other, nor do they
infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent
decision-making and action." 78
Despite the lofty goals expressed in the Founding Act, it is actually a
political agreement and not a legally binding treaty. 179 It does, however,
provide for a Permanent Joint Council, made up of the NATO Secretary
General, a NATO representative from one of the alliance's member states
on a rotating basis, and a representative from Russia. 18° The Council
l7 Burke, supra note 150.
"7 See Afanasievskii, supra note 170, at 158. The text of the Founding Act can be found at 36
I.L.M. 1006 (1997) (reproduced from U.N. Document A/52/161 S/1997/413, Appendix,
May 30, 1997).
174
See Afanasievskii, supra note 170, at 158.
15 See id.

176Id.

7 See Paul Mann, Russia and NATO Agree to Cooperate, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June
2, 1997, at 26.
178Id.
I"7See id. Russia pressed for a full treaty ratified by all participating nations, but the United
States refused. See id.
'I'
See id.
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provides a means of consultation, coordination, and joint decisionmaking in matters of common concern.18' In addition, Russia will have a
Mission at NATO Headquarters headed by an ambassador. 182 All of
these arrangements have attempted to give Russia a sense that it "will be
183
recognized as an equal force in global and European politics."
The Founding Act, though ambitious and carefully negotiated,
apparently has not quieted the critics in Russia and NATO. On the
Russian side, that nation's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was
critical of the Founding Act's history, complaining that "[jiust as the
Russian side from the very beginning formed its vision of the goals and
content of the agreements and their binding nature, the NATO
negotiators strayed far from concrete talk .... In response, we received a
draft that was a blend of pompous statements . .. "184 Even worse,
Russia's ambassador to London griped that the Founding Act was
"simply a choice between bad and very bad outcomes."' 85 Some critics
in the United States tended to agree with these Russian sentiments and
continued to argue against NATO expansion in light of the continuing
Russian fears. 86 On the other hand, quite a few American observers
have been less than complimentary of the Russians and of the Founding
Act in recent months for quite different reasons. For instance, Anderson
argues that complaints such as those of Deputy Minister Afanasievskii
illustrate "Russian diplomacy is accomplishing the very isolation which
Russian officials say NATO expansion threatens" and argues that the
Russians have no strategic fears from new states joining the NATO
alliance. 8 7 Professor Stephen Blank gives an even more blistering
critique of Russian diplomacy efforts regarding the expansion of NATO
and the Founding Act:
".

181See Afanasievskii, supra note 170, at 161.
182See Mann, supra note 177.
183Afanasievskii, supra note 170, at 160.
184Id.
185Jensen, supra note 10.
'8 See, e.g., Pipes, supra note 5, at 65 ("Western leaders ...

should consider whether
extending NATO to Eastern Europe to forestall a putative military threat to the region is
worth alienating the majority of politically active Russians, who see the move as
permanently excluding their country from Europe and giving it no alternative but to seek
allies in the east."). Another commentator, after acknowledging the Russian fears over
NATO expansion, notes "[tihat's why they're cozying up to the Chinese - which is hardly
in the U.S. interest." Jensen, supra note 10.
187Anderson, supra note 162, at 13-15. Indeed, Anderson argues that "[n]uclear weapons
protect Russia against the contingency, utterly implausible anyway, of a military threat
from NATO." Id. at 15.
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Much of this failure stems from Russian elites' inability
or refusal to accept European realities. They still insist
that Russia is a super or great power that must have
global equality with the United States and demand an
exceptional place at the "presidium table" of European
security.
Russia seeks status in Europe, not
responsibility, and refuses to participate except on its
own terms ..... Russia prefers to demilitarize Central
Europe, preserve it as a buffer outside any viable
European security system pending its revival, and
neutralize NATO as an effective security provider.
Russian officials insist that NATO must confine itself to
regional peace operations under UN... auspices, giving
Russia a veto over its activities. And the new Founding
Act with NATO unfortunately goes a long way toward
realizing those objectives and limiting the West's ability
to influence developments in [Russia]. 8
Thus, NATO expansion has not been an easy sell diplomatically and
has garnered criticism from many comers. In addition to the formidable
diplomatic hurdles that must be crossed in pursuit of the goal of
allowing new member states into the alliance, the U.S. must address the
economic concern of who will subsidize the expanded role of NATO.
3.

NATO Expansion Is Prohibitively Expensive

American officials' argument in support of NATO expansion is that
the project will be inexpensive and therefore worth the modest outlay.1 89
An Assistant Secretary of Defense has stated that the costs of NATO
expansion "are in the neighborhood of 1% and less of the overall defense
spending that is anticipated for this time period." 19° But as one pundit
notes, "[w]hen Washington can make a compelling case for a policy, it
does not tell the public that the policy comes cheap."1 91 Furthermore,
several independent studies tend to dispute the government's claims
that NATO expansion will be inexpensive.1 92 And regrettably, the
American taxpayer will bear the burden of subsidizing the expansion of
NATO's role regardless of the cost of this effort.1 93 The countries
1I1 Blank, supra note 169, at 116-17. Even Richard Pipes, who is generally sympathetic
toward Russian fears over NATO expansion, see supra note 186, acknowledges that "[nlo
special favors should be granted [to Russia]. They only whet the appetites of nationalists
who interpret undeserved concessions to mean that the world is so anxious to bring Russia
into the international community that it is prepared to show boundless tolerance for its
behavior." Pipes, supra note 5, at 65.
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currently applying for NATO membership claim they cannot afford the
cost of joining the alliance and Western European governments have
adamantly refused to pay the bill.194 As a former senior defense planner
for the German government has put it, "So who will pick up the tab? I
195
think it will have to be the United States."
What is the tab for NATO expansion that the American taxpayer
will have to pick up? Realistic estimates range as low as $27 billion in a
study formulated by the Pentagon to as high as $125 billion in a
Congressional Budget Office report. 196 Even these reports might be
optimistic, however, as they were heavily influenced by political
considerations and flawed assumptions.197
One of the flawed
assumptions is that NATO is an alliance without an enemy, 198 which
prompts one article to ask with sarcasm, "If there is no credible threat,
either short-term or long-term, to the security of the Central and Eastern
European nations, why expand NATO?" 199 Another flawed assumption
is that very little Will have to be spent to bring former Soviet-bloc armies
up to NATO standards. 200 Much of this assumption rests on the prospect
that the mutual defense obligations of Article 5 in the NATO treaty will
never have to be honored. 201 But such a "paper declaration" poses big
problems, for it rests on the "irresponsible bluff" that neither NATO nor
Russia will engage in hostile actions against each other. 20 2 This again
begs the question: If NATO expansion rests on the assumption that
Russia is not a threat, then why expand?
Realistically, NATO expansion should be viewed as a counter to any
Russian threat. This view will require the deployment of capable forces
189See Anderson, supra note 162, at 8.
190Id.
191

Id.

192See

generally Perlmutter & Carpenter, supra note 162.
Burke, supra note 150; see also Perlmutter & Carpenter, supra note 162, at 3.
194See Burke, supra note 150.
195Perlmutter & Carpenter, supra note 162, at 6.
19 See id. at 3-4. A separate NATO study places the estimate at a mere $1.3 billion to $2
billion, but critics have assailed this estimate as unreliable and even ludicrous. See id. at 2;
Burke, supra note 150.
197See Perlmutter & Carpenter, supra note 162, at 2, 4.
191
Id. at 3. The Pentagon report is so upbeat in its predictions that it proclaims that NATO
"enlargement will yield benefits for the United States, NATO and Europe" and indeed
"will benefit Russian security and the security of other former Soviet states." Id. at 3.
19 d. at 4.
2110See id at 5.
21 See id. at 6.
193See

2(1Id.
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in the new and vulnerable front-line NATO states. 20 3 Such deployments
would not be easy or inexpensive. Most of the nations desiring NATO
24
membership are woefully remiss in achieving NATO requirements. 0
Poland, for example, faces a critical shortage of modem weaponry, and
the weapons it presently owns do not meet NATO standards. 205 Given
these realities, a recent analysis surmises that even the Congressional
Budget Office estimate for NATO expansion would have to be doubled
to $250 billion to credibly provide the technology necessary for new
member states to meet Western standards.20 6 One article further
concludes that NATO expansion "is not a strategy, but a worrisome case
of self-delusion that may end up costing the United States more than
207
dollars and cents."
Critics forewarn American taxpayers about the potential difficulties
involved in bankrolling NATO expansion:
As far as the United States is concerned, we get a bigger,
more expensive, more unwieldy alliance that commits
us to defend Eastern and Central Europe-from what
we're not sure, since Russia is no longer deemed a
threat-but also will require so much consultation and
consensus-seeking it may be effectively paralyzed. 20 8
Unfortunately, the expansion of U.S. obligations under NATO is not
our only concern; the rest of the world has come calling as well.
B.

The Expansion of U.S. Obligationsto the United Nations

In 1945, the drafters of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter sought to
prevent the recurrence of a World War II-like disaster by limiting the
unilateral use of force and by creating mechanisms for multilateral
peacekeeping efforts. 20 9 Article 43 of the Charter specifically required
that "[a]ll Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces assistance, and facilities,
20

3See id.

204See id. at 4.

215 See Hubert M. Krolikowski, Poland Battles "Hollow Forces" Syndrome, JANE'S INT'L
DEFENSE REv., June 1997, at 12.
2( See Perlmutter & Carpenter, supra note 162, at 4.
2m Id. at 6.
2 Jensen, supranote 10.
2119
See DYcus ET AL., supra note 15, at 292.
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including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
210
international peace and security."
Shortly after Congress ratified the U.N. Charter, it sought to further
delineate the role of U.S. forces in U.N. operations by passing the United
Nations Participation Act. 21 ' Over the ensuing years, Congress has
enacted many more, sometimes confusing, statutes authorizing use of
212
the armed forces for humanitarian assistance under U.N. auspices.
Despite these authorizations, in the fifty years after ratification of the
U.N. Charter, the United States never seriously attempted to enter into
an Article 43 agreement. 213 However, that precedent changed with the
end of the Cold War.
In the 1990's, the U.N. has played an increasing role in maintaining
international peace. 214 This increasing role has involved operations in
215
nations such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.
These operations have, in the words of one observer, resulted "in greater
responsibility for the U.N. and less sovereignty for the participating
nations, including the United States." 216 U.S. forces have seen their
participation in these U.N. efforts increase dramatically over the past few
years. 217 By the end of 1993, approximately 72,000 U.S. personnel were
participating in eighteen separate U.N. peacekeeping missions around
the world. 218 By the end of 1997, this role had expanded so much that
the U.S. Navy had established through its International Programs Office
a course "designed to provide [U.N.] students with fundamentals of
Id. at 294 (quoting Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031). In a move
that foretold congressional ambivalence about Article 43 many decades later, several
Senators urged that a reservation be adopted that would allow Congress to approve or
disapprove every use of U.S. military forces under any Article 43 agreement. But a
majority in the Senate were convinced to reject this proposal, using arguments that
Congress would be able to approve any Article 43 agreement beforehand, that these
agreements would only be used in "police actions" short of war, and the United States
would be able to veto any objectionable Article 43 agreements as a permanent member of
the U.N. Security Council. Id. at 298.
211See 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1994); see also DYcUs Er AL., supra note 15, at 294.
212See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 376.
213See id. at 295.
214 See Robert S. Winner, Spc. Michael New v. William Perry, Secretary of Defense: The
Constitutionality of U.S. Forces Serving Under U.N. Command, 3 DEPAUL DIG. INT'L L. 30
(1997). Terms such as "peacekeeping" and "peacemaking" are a bit misleading, for troops
participating in such efforts may encounter armed resistance or outright hostilities. See
DYCUS ET AL., supra note 15, at 376.
215 See Winner, supra note 214, at 30; DYcus Er AL., supra note 15, at 375-76.
216Winner, supra note 214.
217See DYcUS Er AL., supra note 15, at 375.
218 See id.
210
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international and humanitarian law that impact on military operations
and, specifically, peace operations." 219 Widespread media coverage of
catastrophes around the world has pressured the United States to
For example, many
participate in these types of foreign affairs.
observers credit the media's coverage of starving children with the
deployment of U.S. troops to Somalia; they also attribute the withdrawal
of troops to the coverage of American troops being killed and
desecrated. 220 Whatever the causes, these deployments soon caused
friction when it became obvious that the United States would not always
221
control and command the operations in which its troops participated.
The debacle in Somalia provides a clear illustration of the friction
caused by increased American participation in U.N. operations. In 1991,
Somalia fell into a seemingly endless cycle of civil war and famine
caused largely by fighting between rival clans. 222 U.S. forces soon began
helping with U.N. relief efforts; in August 1992, U.S. warplanes helped
airlift humanitarian supplies into the country. 2 The clans continued
fighting, however, and the U.N. shortly called for the deployment of
U.N. personnel to provide security and humanitarian relief. 224 President
Bush responded in December 1992 by ordering the United States' forces
to provide a secure environment for the relief efforts, and within a
month over 28,000 military personnel were deployed to the area. 225 Until
May, 1993, these forces remained under the command and control of the
United States. 226 In that month, with the Clinton Administration now in
the White House, the United States relinquished command of its
remaining troops to the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).227
This act proved to be a watershed event. No United States troops had
been placed under foreign command since World War II, and never had
they been placed under U.N. command using Article 43.228 Apparently
219

1nternational Students
Study
Peacekeeping Law
(visited
Nov.
5,
1997)
<http://www.navy.mil> (an Internet story in the Navy News Service, story NNS4704).
"The course is designed to increase the students' understanding of the peacekeeping
process, from the United Nations to the checkpoint, and the significance of the legal aspects
of international coalition peace operations." Id. Appendix I provides a detailed list of some
of the many U.N. obligations that the United States has participated in over the past few
years.
21 See Dunlap, supranote 6, at 383.
221See Winner, supra note 214, at 30.
222See DYcUs ET AL., supra note 15, at 377.
M See id. at 377-78.
224 See id. at 378.
2 See id.
22
6 See id. at 385.
227See id. at 385, 389.
m See id. at 390.
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nervous with this new precedent, Congress soon placed a twelve-month
limit on the authorization of troops in Somalia. 229
In June, 1993, disaster struck the now U.N.-led American troops in
Somalia. On June 5, Somali clan forces ambushed a U.N. convoy killing
twenty-four Pakistani troops and injuring three American soldiers. In
response, U.S. forces were ordered to conduct a raid on the Headquarters
of Mohammed Farah Hassan Aidid, the leader of the clan responsible for
the ambush. 23 0 Pinned down in the ensuing fight, outgunned by the clan
troops, and unable to obtain assistance from other U.N. troops,
seventeen American soldiers were killed and eighty-four were
wounded. 231 The raid caused an uproar in the United States, with many
speculating that the Clinton Administration had left the United States
troops under-equipped for their mission. 232 In the wake of the disaster,
President Clinton reported to Congress that he would withdraw all U.S.
troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, 2-3 and Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin resigned his post. Apparently not satisfied with these measures,
Congress soon passed legislation mandating a withdrawal by the same
March 31 cutoff and requiring all American forces remaining in Somalia
to be placed under U.S. command and control.24 On February 26, 1994,
all American troops were withdrawn from Somalia. 23- America's brief
foray into the reach of Article 43 had apparently come to an end.
The Clinton Administration did not give up on Article 43-type
commitments, however. After the Somalia disaster, the President issued
Presidential Decision Directive, Number 25 (PDD-25), in which he stated
the following: "On a case by case basis, the President will consider
placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a
competent U.N. commander for specific U.N. operations authorized by
the Security Council." 236 Specifically using the end of the Cold War as
the justification for greater use of multilateral action, PDD-25 drastically
reforms the military relationship between the United States and the U.N.
229
See id. at 385 (citing S.J. Res. 45 of May 25, 1993).
2) See DYCUS ET AL., supranote 15, at 386.
231See id.
232See id.
233See id.

23 See id.
235See id. at 387.
236Winner, supra note 214, at 36.

Winner notes that PDD-25 was not publicly released
because of its confidential nature, but analyses of it have been published. See id. at 31 n.4;
see also DYcus ET AL., supra note 15, at 389 (citing The Clinton Administration's Policy on
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations 9 (May 1994) (summarizing key elements of PPD-

25)).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss1/5

Davis: Swords into Plowshares? The Dangerous Politicization of the Milit

19981

SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES

93

concerning American troops. 237 Using PDD-25 as a basis, Clinton
subsequently deployed United States troops to Macedonia in support of
U.N. operations. 238 In the process, he unwittingly gave opponents of his
new policy a poster child in the personage of Army Specialist Michael
New.

2 39

On August 21, 1995, the military informed Specialist New that his
division would be going to Macedonia in October as part of U.N.
peacekeeping forces. 24° He would serve under non-American U.N.
commanders and wear U.N. insignia. 241 Believing the deployment
orders to be unconstitutional (among other claims), New refused to
follow them and was subsequently court-martialed for violating Article
92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice by disobeying a direct
order. 242 He received a bad conduct discharge in the wake of his
conviction. 243 Displeased with this outcome, New sought relief in federal
civilian courts, with his lawyer claiming his orders were akin to a "badge
of slavery; Michael New has been ordered to join a foreign military." 244
Unfortunately for New, a U.S. district court rejected his petition for writ
of habeas corpus, and a court of appeals affirmed this decision saying
that he must exhaust his appeals in the military justice system before
seeking redress in civilian court.245 New ended up a hero among
conservative politicians, however. 246 Representative Helen Chenoweth
(R-Idaho) even hosted a rally for New and introduced a non-binding
resolution in Congress that "'. . . condemns the deployment of United
States military personnel in the service of the United Nations in the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a violation of both the
Constitution and the laws of the United States."' 247 Political supporters
of both parties eventually defended New, and one legal scholar wrote
that "New's argument regarding the deployment to Macedonia is

237
See Winner, supra note 214, at 31-32, 36-37.
2-See id. at 31.
239See generally Rowan Scarborough, New Wants a Civilian Court to Settle His U.N. Insignia
Case, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1997, at A3.
24 See Winner, supra note 214, at 30.
241See id.
242See id. at 30-31.
243See id.

244Scarborough, supra note 239.
245See New v. Cohen, 129 F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Scarborough, supra note 239.
New's case was still on appeal in the military court system as this article was written. 129
F.3d
at 641.
26
1 See Scarborough, supra note 239.
247 ld.
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legitimate and should be fully reviewed." 248 The scholar also asked,
"[h]ow can the President remain as Commander-in-Chief if (s)he no
longer commands the U.S. troops?" 249
Another recent observer
suggested that:
S. . the plight of Spc. New, sad though it may be, is less
of a problem than the more profound issue which has
bedeviled the United States for half a century. Is it fair,
is it honorable or is it legal to send an American into
battle under colors not his own? And over his objection?
Does anyone have the authority to abrogate a soldier's
solemn oath and commit him to combat under another
sovereign? This is a basic matter, involving the lives and
welfare of American soldiers. It needs to be addressed
and solved, once and for all.25°
All of these political conflicts over the growing U.N. role of
American troops point to the serious problems that such commitments
foster. U.S. forces find themselves doing more around the globe at the
same time their domestic role is growing. Yet ironically, their size and
resources are shrinking drastically.25l Many servicemembers now feel
like a "meals on wheels" program for the U.N. and jokingly claim to be a
branch of the Peace Corps instead of the Department of Defense. The
use of U.S. troops in U.N. operations has grown drastically since the end
of the Cold War, and the placement of American forces under U.N.
command is unprecedented. American troops are being asked to
fundamentally change their international roles, as the sad case of
Michael New illustrates. These modifications by themselves would be
enough to strain the military. Unfortunately, other changes are being
thrust on the armed forces, exacerbating these modifications.
IV. KEEPING UP WITH AMERICAN SOCIAL CHANGES

This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separatefrom civilian society.... The differences
between the military and civilian communities result from the fact

248 Winner, supra note 214, at 44.
249 Id. at 36.
250 V. H. Krulak, U.S. Forces in U.N. Uniforms?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 21,1998, at B6.
251 For example, in the past ten years, the Navy has seen its fleet reduced from almost 600
ships to less than 350. See Webb, supra note 7. The Air Force has plummeted in the same
time from 607,000 members to 371,000, a cut of about 40%. See Susan M. Schafer, Air Force
Seeks to Revamp U.S. Bases, Support Units, MARIETTA DAILY J., May 3,1998, at 3A.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss1/5

Davis: Swords into Plowshares? The Dangerous Politicization of the Milit

1998]

SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES

that "it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise." . . . "[Tihe rights of
men in the armedforces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain
overriding demands of discipline and duty." . . .While members of
the military community enjoy many of the same rights and bear
many of the same burdens as do members of the civilian community,
within the military community there is simply not the same
autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community .... [Tihe
different character of the military community and of the military
mission requires a different application of those protections. The
fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity
for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the
military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside
it.... In the armedforces some restrictions exist for reasons that
have no counterpartin the civilian community.252
During the Cold War, both the executive and judicial branches of
government were content to recognize the principles articulated in Parker
v. Levy and largely left the military and Congress to decide who could
join the armed forces. With the end of the Cold War and with social
attitudes apparently changing in the 90's, however, this long tradition of
deference suddenly came to a halt. In 1993 with a more sympathetic
President now in power, feminists and homosexual activists had an ally
in their quest to open up the military demographically. Regrettably, as
the previous sections have revealed, "President Clinton's support for
placing women in combat roles and his desire to end the homosexual
exclusion policy could not have been more ill-timed as these views
assault the ethos of an organization already obsessively anxious about its
future in the post-Cold War world." 2 3 The following sections examine
how these fundamental changes in the personnel policies of the armed
forces originated.

22 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,743-44,751,758-59 (1974)
23

5 Dunlap, supra note 6, at 372-73. Demographic issues involving the military have become
extremely volatile, and anyone who expresses opinions on these issues unfortunately runs
the risk of being needlessly yet strongly attacked. Thus, at the outset, a cautionary note
should be made regarding Part IV of this paper. It is not the author's intent to demean the
valuable military contributions made by women or homosexuals in any way. Nor is it the
author's intention to imply that demographic decisions should be made by anyone other
than the civilian leaders of the military, as Part H of this paper should illustrate by way of
analogy. The purpose of Part IV is simply to demonstrate that these decisions are
sometimes made for purely emotional or political reasons rather than for practical
purposes giving due regard to military necessity and the principles outlined in Parker v.
Lev.
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Women in Combat

The military has long been a male-oriented institution.25' Despite
this description, as long ago as the Revolutionary War, and in all
subsequent military campaigns, women have served honorably in the
armed forces. 55s This fact notwithstanding, prior to 1948 no women
could officially enlist in the military56 But, the end of the Cold War
ushered in a dramatic change in the role of women in the military. In the
1990's, with the military relying solely on volunteers and with society
insisting on greater opportunities for women, the armed services now
have a combined force that is more than 13% female. 5 7 Thus, the United
States today has more women in its armed forces than any other nation
in the world.258
Although the services vary widely in the scope of jobs open to
women, until very recently all excluded women from combat positions.
Prior to 1993, the Department of Defense defined combat positions based
on a "risk rule," which stated that "'. . . risks of direct combat, exposure
to hostile fire, or capture are proper criteria for closing positions or units
to women."' Under this rule, women could not serve in positions that
presented risks "'. . . equal to, or greater than, risks for direct combat
9
units or positions with which they are normally in close proximity."'2
In the early 90's, the military reexamined this policy. With the risks of
the Cold War gone and with women having served with distinction in
Desert Storm, President Bush appointed a commission to investigate the
possibility of opening combat slots to women. 260 The commission
ultimately recommended only moderate increases in the number of
261
combat positions in which women should be allowed to serve.

254
See Lucinda J. Peach, Women at War: The Ethics of Women in Combat, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL'Y 199, 201 (1994).
25 See id.
25 See id. In that year, Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act,
which allowed the enlistment of women in the armed forces. See id. Prior to this, women
were only allowed in separate "auxiliary" forces. See id.
257See Congressman Lee Hamilton, Women in the Military (visited April 26, 1998)
<http://www.house.gov/hamilton/women.html. This is an increase from less than 2% in
the early 1970's. See id.
2-See Peach, supra note 254, at 199.
259
Id.at 204.
2M0
See id.
at 206.
261See id.Specifically, the commission recommended that Navy combat ships be opened to
women. See id. Just prior to the commission's report, Congress lifted a longstanding ban
on women flying combat aircraft. See id.
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Despite the Presidential commission's recommendation, national
events pushed the issue of women in combat to the forefront. In
September 1991, the Navy found itself embroiled in a nasty scandal
called Tailhook which involved allegations of sexual abuse of women by
262
Navy and Marine Corps pilots at a convention in Las Vegas.
Apparently unable to defend itself through traditional public relations
efforts, the Navy began looking for ways to improve its image by
opening more positions to women. 263 Shortly thereafter, a newly elected
President Clinton expressed a goal of placing more women in combat
positions. 264 The die had been cast for rolling back the "risk rule."
Pushed by feminist activists such as Representative Patricia Schroeder
(D-Colo.), the Clinton Administration took advantage of the atmosphere
created by Tailhook. 265 On April 28, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin announced that:
[A]s we downsize the military to meet the conditions of
the post-Cold War world, we must ensure that we have
the most ready and effective force possible. In order to
maintain readiness and effectiveness, we need to draw
from the largest available talent pool and select the most
266
qualified individual for each military job.
Accordingly, he directed the armed services to do the following: 1)
permit women to compete for assignments in aircraft, including combat
aircraft; 2) open as many additional Navy ships to women as possible;
and 3) study opportunities for opening additional Army and Marine
Corps ground forces to women. 267 On January 13, 1994, Secretary Aspin
went even further by rescinding the "risk rule." 268 In its place, he
established the following rule:

262See

Dunlap, supra note 6, at 354 & n.91.

263 For

an excellent overview of the Tailhook scandal, see FRONTLINE show #1502, supra
note 6.
264 See Dunlap, supra note 6, at 372-73.
26
5See Christopher Corbett, Who Killed Kara Hultgreen? (visited Apr. 26, 1998)
<http://www.usaradio.com/pov/artides/art4795.fcr.html>.
266 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretaries of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness and for Reserve Affairs (Apr. 28, 1993) (available at
<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/women/memol993.txt>).
27 See id.
268 See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretaries of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness and for Reserve Affairs (Jan. 13, 1994) (available at
<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/women/memoOI13.txt>).
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Service members are eligible to be assigned to all
positions for which they are qualified, except that
women shall be excluded from assignment to units
below the brigade level whose primary mission is to
269
engage in direct combat on the ground.

In the wake of these new guidelines, the Department of Defense opened
more than 80,000 combat-related jobs to women. 270 As a result, more
than 92% of the career fields and approximately 80% of the total jobs in
the armed services were open to women. 271 At the same time, the armed
forces, with the notable exception of the Marine Corps, stepped up the
272
integration of men and women in basic training courses.
Shortly after these dramatic changes unfolded, critics expressed
some concern. This time, unlike past examples, the poster child for their
concerns would prove to be a posthumous one. Shortly after the Navy
began to integrate women into combat aviation units, Lieutenant Kara
Hultgreen was assigned to an F-14 squadron aboard the aircraft carrier
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72) as one of the first women combat
pilots. 273 In October 1994, Lieutenant Hultgreen was killed while trying
to land on the carrier off the coast of California. Opponents of women in
combat suspected that she had been rushed into her new role and
promoted above her level of skill simply because she was a woman.
Navy investigators at first discounted this possibility, blaming the crash
on engine failure. However, a secret copy of the actual Mishap
Investigation Report, in which the crash was blamed on pilot error, was
eventually leaked to the public. Some of Lieutenant Hultgreen's fellow
pilots risked their careers by publicly questioning the Navy's decision to
rush her and other women into combat units. Suddenly, the Navy had
another scandal that focused on the treatment of women. The civilian
critics of women in the military quickly blamed Lieutenant Hultgreen's
death on political correctness and on a race to correct past ills.
In recent months, the role of women in the military has once again
come to the forefront with the case of Air Force Lieutenant Kelly Flinn,
269Id.

270 See Hamilton, supra note 257.
271 See id.
272See Adam G. Mersereau, The Military Should Fight Wars, Not Sexism, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
1998, at A18.
273The following discussion of the Kara Hultgreen tragedy is drawn from 60 Minutes (CBS
television broadcast, April 19, 1998) and Corbett, supra note 265. Additional details are
drawn from the memory of the author of this paper, who served aboard USS ABRAHAM
LINCOLN (CVN 72) in 1992-1994.
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who was dismissed from the service for adultery, fraternization, lying,
and disobeying orders, and with charges of sexual harassment in the
Army. 274 These many incidents have raised concerns that the rapidly
expanding role of women in the military may have been ill-advised or at
least too hasty. Voicing those concerns, Congressman Lee Hamilton (DInd.) stated that "[t]he military... continues to face difficult questions on
the role of women in the armed forces" and urges that further changes
"should occur incrementally and with extensive consultation with
military leaders." 275 Others have made less moderate remarks. For
example, one observer argued rather bluntly that "the expansion of
women's military roles into physically demanding combat and combatsupport units has been a mistake. . . . [R]e-evaluation is urgently
276
needed."
Several independent studies support the criticisms of women's
rapid integration into the armed forces. In 1994, Lucinda Peach
compiled an in-depth report focusing on women in combat. 277 In her
findings, she indicated that many proponents of women in combat fail to
grasp some basic problems, among them the following:
- There are some combat positions which most women
are unable to perform because they lack the requisite
physical strength. "[Mlost women do not have the same
degree of upper body and cardiovascular strength as
men. "278
- Pregnancy presents a genuine problem to fully
integrating women into combat roles and is a legitimate
reason to exclude women from actually engaging in
some forms of combat. 279
- "Attrition and reenlistment data for women indicate
that motherhood is a primary reason why women leave
the military."
Women also comprise a "larger
percentage of single parents in the military." Thus,
"family obligations may... present practical problems
for women's ability to carry out combat assignments." 280

274See

Hamilton, supra note 257.

275Id.

276Mersereau, supra note 272.
27

7 See Peach, supra note 254.
28 Id. at 217.
279See id. at 219.

2m Id. at 220-21.
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- The "likely impact of a reversal of the combat exclusion
would be to make women available to be drafted."
Thus, the goals of women's "liberation" might ironically
be infringed upon; wholesale removal of the exclusion
"risks imposing further restrictions on women's
autonomy than currently exist under the combat
28
exclusion." 1
Ultimately, Peach chides her fellow feminists for "gloss[ing] over
these difficulties" 282 and argues merely that "all assignments for which
women are qualified and capable should be made available to them."28 3 In
addition to the practical concerns, she notes that "little consideration has
been given specifically to the moral and ethical dimensions of the issue"
by proponents of greater roles for women in the military. 284
Critics' concerns have also found support in another highly
influential study. On behalf of Congress and the Department of Defense
in 1997, a civilian panel led by former Senator Nancy Kassebaum-Baker
studied sex-integrated training and related gender issues in the
military. 285 The panel recommended that basic training for all of the
armed services be resegregated. 286 At least one observer has even urged
that the panel's recommendations "do not go far enough in reversing the
expansion of women's military roles." 287 Some military leaders have
expressed similar recommendations, echoing the words of retired U.S.
Army Brigadier General Andrew Gatsis:
No woman, even as a volunteer, should have the right to
go into combat simply because she desires to do so.... It
is a matter of jeopardizing the lives of soldiers, who
depend on all members of a team to do their full share,

281Id. at 238.
282Id. at 231. For a more poignant description of the dangers posed by the physical
limitations of women in combat, see Adam. G. Mersereau, 'Diversity' May Prove Deadly on
the Battlefield, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1996, at A22.
283 Peach, supra note 254, at 240 (emphasis added). Peach finds a kindred voice in
Congressman Hamilton, who states, "I believe women deserve the opportunity to serve in
certain combat positions if they meet service requirements and qualifications for those
assignments and if doing so is in the best interest of national security." Hamilton, supra note
257 (emphasis added).
28
1Peach, supra note 254, at 200.
285See Mersereau, supranote 272.
286
See id.
287Id.
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and of the right of every American citizen to have the
288
strongest national defense possible.
B.

The ContinuingControversy Over Homosexuals in the Military

The role of women is not the only demographic issue facing the
military in the post-Cold War era. For many years, military regulations
have stated that homosexuality is "incompatible with military
service." 289 Prior to the demise of the Cold War, federal courts rejected
arguments that either equal protection or First Amendment rights
protected homosexuals from dismissal from the armed forces.290 The
general deference to military regulations was backed by the Supreme
Court in such cases as Parker v. Levy. Even the more liberal members of
the Court were mindful that "[a] number of serviceman's individual
rights must necessarily be subordinated to the overriding military
mission, and.., the military may constitutionally prohibit conduct that
is quite permissible in civilian life... ."291 Thus, courts have almost
uniformly deferred to the military's claim that the presence of
292
homosexuals in the ranks would be detrimental to the forces.
Homosexuality in the military became a hotly debated issue when
President Clinton took office in 1993.293 Keeping his campaign promises,
Clinton quickly announced his intentions to lift the ban on homosexuals
serving in the armed forces. 294 His announcement created a firestorm of
controversy, 295 and he was forced to delay any action "for six months
while the Secretary of Defense worked with the Joint Chiefs to come up
with a proposal for changing [the existing] policy." 296 After six months
2m Corbett, supra note 265.
M SHANOR & HoGuE, supra note 37, at 47. For an informative look at the historical
exclusion of homosexuals from U.S. military service, see David M. Bessho, Note; The
MilitaryBan on Homosexuals: Suspect, Constitutional,or Both? 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845 (1996).
2WSee SHANOR & HoGUE, supra note 37, at 47.
291 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 787 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting; Justice Stewart was
joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan in his dissent).
M9"
See SHANOR & HOGUE, supra note 37, at 47.
29 See id.
294See id. Some activists likened the existing policy on homosexuals to the military's past
discrimination against blacks. Many African-American military leaders bristled at this
comparison, however. See Lynne Duke, Drawing Parallels--Gaysand Blacks; Linking Military
Ban to Integration Fight Stirs Outrage, Sympathy, WASH. POST, Feb. 13., 1993, at Al. For
example, General Colin Powell, in disputing the analogy between homosexuality and race
when discussing military discrimination, said, "Homosexuality is not a benign . . .
characteristic such as skin color ....
It goes to one of the most fundamental aspects of
human behavior." Id.
295
See SHANOR & HoGUE, supra note 37, at 47-48.
2" President Bill Clinton, Remarks by the President at National Defense University, (July 19,
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of often rancorous debate on the issue, the President announced the
guidelines for his new policy in a speech at National Defense
University. 297 While acknowledging that "the American people are
deeply divided on this issue," that "our military is a conservative
institution," and that "most military people [are] opposed to lifting the
ban because of the feared impact on unit cohesion . .. and the fear of
invasion of privacy," the President outlined what he called "an
honorable compromise." 298 In contrast to the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Parker, President Clinton viewed the homosexuality issue in terms of
individual rights. 299 His announcement delineated four principles
governing homosexuals in the military:
One, servicemen and women will be judged based
on their conduct, not their sexual orientation.
Two, therefore, the practice, now six months old, of
not asking about sexual orientation in the enlistment
procedure will continue.
Three, an open statement by a service member that
he or she is a homosexual will create a rebuttable
presumption that he or she intends to engage [in]
prohibited conduct, but the service member will be
given an opportunity to refute that presumption; in
other words, to demonstrate that he or she intends to
live by the rules of conduct that apply in the military
service.
And four, all provisions of the Uniform [Code of]
Military Justice will be enforced in an even-handed
manner as regards both heterosexuals and homosexuals.
And, . . . there will be a decent regard to the legitimate
1993) <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/homosexu/linO7l9.txt>.
The
President did, however, direct that military recruiters should immediately stop asking the
sexual orientation of applicants. See id.
297 See id. The extended debate on the issue of homosexuals in the military involved
Congress as well. For example, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, who harbored reservations about Clinton's plan to lift the ban on
homosexuals, said in a floor speech, "We are not talking about civilian life. We are talking
about military life, and there are fundamental differences that our military people know
well but too many times those of us in civilian life do not keep in mind." John Lancaster,
Why the Military Supports the Ban on Gays; Arguments Ranging From Privacy to AIDS Offered
Against Clinton's Rights Pledge, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1993, at A8. Ultimately, President
Clinton and Congress worked out a compromise, which was both codified by Congress at
10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994) and announced by the Clinton Administration in various
memoranda and directives to be discussed later.
298Clinton, supra note 296.
2" Id.
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privacy and
members. 300

associational

rights

of

all

service

Secretary of Defense Aspin quickly followed President Clinton's speech
with a memorandum directing the armed forces to implement the new
policy and adding additional guidance for the services. 3 1 He also
trotted out the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to publicly support
the new policy. 3°2 Five months later on December 22, 1993, he codified
the new policy in Department of Defense regulations that spelled out the
new guidelines in excruciating detail. The regulations covered five areas
of the armed forces: accessions, separations, criminal investigation,
personnel security, and military training. 303
President Clinton's new policy quickly became known as "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell." 3° 4 Despite all of the attempts to clarify the new policy,
however, it almost immediately became a source of trouble for the
military as a whole and individual homosexual servicemembers. Several
members discharged under the new policy filed suit in federal court
using such claims as First Amendment rights and Equal Protection. 30 5
Id.
301See Les Aspin, Memorandumfor the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of

300

the
Air
Force, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff
(July
19,
1993)
<http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/homosexu/aspiO7l9.txt>. For example,
Secretary Aspin's memorandum contained some very clear guidance such as,
"Servicemembers will be separated for homosexual conduct." Id. However, it also
contained rather confusing standards for conducting investigations of alleged homosexual
conduct:
Commanders and investigating agencies will not initiate inquiries or
investigations solely to determine a member's sexual orientation.
Servicemembers will not be asked or required to reveal their sexual
orientation. However, commanders will continue to initiate inquiries
or investigations, as appropriate, when there is credible information
that a basis for discharge or disciplinary action exists.
Id. Figuring out the nuances of this language would prove to be troublesome over the next
few years, as this article will shortly discuss.
" See Les Aspin, Remarks at Fort McNair (July 19, 1993) http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/
navpalib/people/homosexu/ powe0719.txt (includes public comments by members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff).
3w See Press Release, Secretary Aspin Releases New Regulations on Homosexual Conduct in the
Armed Forces (Dec. 22, 1993) <http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib.people/homosexu/
hmsxregs.txt>.
30
4SHANOR & HOGUE, supra note 37, at 48.
-' See id. at 48, 309. Examples of such cases include Meinhold v. United States Dept. of
Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Able v.
United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403 (W.D.
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The diversity of opinions governing these suits in the lower courts
prompted many observers to note that the legality of the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy is ripe for Supreme Court review, and judicial chaos
over the new policy will likely reign until the Court renders a decision
on this controversy. 306 More ominous signs that the policy is confusing
have arisen in the past few years, however. In 1994, the military
discharged 617 servicemembers for homosexual conduct. By 1997, this
number had risen to 997. 307 Finding these statistics alarming, the
Department of Defense formed a review panel to investigate this
matter. 308 On April 24, 1998, the Department announced the panel's
recommendations, all of which became a part of the military's official
policy on homosexuality:
-- Commanders should check with higher headquarters
legal officials before investigating whether a service
member is homosexual.
-- The department should issue more guidance on
pretrial agreements. The agreements are sometimes
used to obtain information on consensual sexual conduct
as part of criminal investigations.
-- In so-called "coming out" cases, the commander's
decision to conduct an investigation should not be made
without careful review.
-- DOD should provide more training for commanders,
attorneys and particularly for investigators who review
the facts of alleged policy violations.

Wash. 1996); Philips v. Perry, 883 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Richenberg v. Perry, 909
F. Supp. 1303 (D. Neb 1995); Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Va. 1995);
Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994); and Dahl v. Secretary of the
United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
3WSee SHANOR & HoGUE, supra note 37, at 310 ("Until the Supreme Court resolves the
divisions among the lower courts, litigation will continue."); Dunlap, supra note 6, at 369-70
("Another issue, not yet before the Court but almost certain to reach it, is the
constitutionality of the 'don't ask don't tell' policy relating to gays in the military.... It
remains to be seen, however, if the judiciary will depart from the traditional view when
faced with the highly controversial issue ....
").The suits appear to stand little chance of
ultimate success given the Supreme Court's historical deference to military policies, even
under a strict scrutiny analysis. See Bessho, supranote 291.
'" See Staff Sergeant Alicia K. Borlik, Cohen Accepts Revisions to Homosexual Policy,
AMERICAN FoRcEs PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 24,1998.
-0 See id.
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-- DOD should issue guidance that makes it clear that
harassment of service members based on their alleged
sexual orientation is unacceptable. 3°9
The panel's recommendations and the statistics that prompted them
indicate that serious problems fester inside of the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" guidelines.
As troubling as these developments are for homosexual service
members, developments in other areas have hurt the armed forces as a
whole in the national quest to formulate a new policy on homosexuality.
This harm results from the actions of gay rights advocates who have
forgone working through the political process and have begun to
directly attack the military in a manner reminiscent of the unfortunate
politicalization of the armed forces that accompanied the Vietnam
War.310 For example, during the search for a replacement for General
Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gay rights
organizations capsized the candidacy of Marine Corps General Joseph
Hoar.311 Ignoring the fact that the military's homosexual policy is a
matter ultimately decided not by military commanders but by civilian
leaders, the organizations assailed General Hoar for enforcing the ban on
gays during a tour as commander of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot.312
Needless to say, he was not selected as Chairman.
Homosexual advocates have also created challenges to the already
difficult job of military recruitment and education on many university
campuses. 313 Blaming the military for congressional and executive
policies, these advocates have attempted to ban recruiters and ROTC
units in their zeal to oppose the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. These
actions hurt the career choices of students and the legitimate efforts of
recruiters who had nothing to do with formulating the policy. 314 Some
law schools joined this cause by promptly banning military Judge
Advocate General recruiters in the wake of encouragement by the
309d.
310See Dunlap, supra note 6, at 364.
31 See id.

312See id. at 364-65.

31 See id. at 364.
314 THE GAZErrE, a newspaper in Cedars Rapids, Iowa, perhaps stated it most succinctly in
its editorial of Oct. 11, 1997 regarding the ban on military recruiters at the University of
Iowa College of Law: "Where we find the college's policy offensive.., is that it enforced
what it proclaimed undesirable: By protecting or defending the rights of one class of
people, it deprived others of equal access to resources and opportunity." The full editorial
may be found on the Internet at <http://www.gazetteonline.com/educate/edu171.htm>.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [1998], Art. 5

106

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33

American Association of Law Schools (AALS). 315 Though a U.S. Court of
Appeals had previously ruled that such bans were illegal under the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 316 the law schools that
adopted the ban stood firm, creating a backlash in both state legislatures
and the U.S. Congress. Representatives soon introduced bills in their
state assemblies that would overturn the bans,317 and U.S. Representative
Gerald Solomon (R-N.Y.) succeeded in pushing legislation through the
U.S. Congress that would cut off federal funding to schools that
implemented such proscriptions. 318 In the wake of the so-called
"Solomon Amendments" and other pressures, schools around the
country were forced to rescind the ban, and the AALS modified its
319
policy as well.
Those who have made political attacks on the military concerning
policies on homosexuality have made the same mistakes of protesters
during the Vietnam War. As military analyst Harry Summers explained
in 1982, "By attacking the executors of Vietnam policy rather than the
makers of that policy, the protestors were striking at the very heart of
our democratic system--civilian control of the military." 320 As another
observer has noted, "By challenging the military itself, the critics induced
public responses from the armed forces. The protestors thus legitimized
military expression on partisan issues." 321 These same dangers are
present today. Reluctantly thrust into the political -debate over the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, the armed services have been forced to
defend themselves publicly. 322 The public debates have politicized the

315 See

Brett S. Martin, Military Bans Cost Schools FederalFunds, NAT'L JURIST, Oct. 1997, at 8.
See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986).
317 See, e.g., H.R. 628 (N.C. 1997), H.R. 954,144th Gen. Assem., (Ga. 1997).
318 See Christina Cheakalos, Military Gets Off Bias Hook: GSU Law School Fears for Funds,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 20, 1997, at F2; see also Bob Norberg, New Law Imperils SSU
Funding; Military Recruiting Ban Sticking Point, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.), Dec. 14,
1996, at B1. For the language of Rep. Solomon's amendments, see Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div.
A, Title I, § 101(e) [Title V, § 514], 110 Stat. 3009-270 (1996) (added as a note to 10 U.S.C. §
316

503).
319 See

Martin, supra note 315; Cheakalos, supra note 318; George Snyder, Sonoma State Lifts
Ban on Military Recruiters, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18,1996, at A26; see also W. Kent Davis, Military
Service Should Be Respected, But It Isn't, NAVY TIMES, May 18, 1998, at 31. The American
Civil Liberties Union, in consultation with some of the law schools that originally upheld
the ban on military recruiters, is apparently exploring the feasibility of challenging the
Solomon Amendments on constitutional grounds. Terry Carter, Costly Principles:Pentagon
Forces Law Schools to Choose Between Federal Funding and Backing of Gay Rights, ABA J., Dec.
1997, at 30,31.
n 0 Dunlap, supranote 6, at 364 & n.170.
31 Id.
322

at 364.

See id.
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military, an organization that is supposed to be nonpartisan in all
respects. 323 In short, "[t]he misguided activists send the military
community a troubling message ....

The activists imply that military

officers should condition their actions not on the lawful dictates of the
civilian leadership, but on their own assessment of the present-and
future- political climate." 324 Thus, the line between the military and
civilian spheres has once again blurred. The ongoing erosion of civilian
leadership of the armed forces has taken another step forward.
V.

CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War military environment--institutionaluncertainty
(how deep will the cuts go?), burgeoning technological change (what
is the face of modern warfare?), renewed interest in social
experimentation (what is the role for women and gays?), combined
with expanding expectations of what the military can and ought to
do to make peace, succor the afflicted, and respond to disasters-fosters conditions where civil-military harmony should not be taken
for granted. To foresee the potential for friction is a far cry from
declaring it inevitable....

Yet ignoring the military distemper will

only allow it tofester. 325
These are trying times for the military. The end of the Cold War
allowed the nation to vigorously reevaluate the role of the armed forces
and push for fundamental changes in the national military policy. Yet
little attention has been paid to the dangers that these changes can bring.
On the domestic front, the military has been pushed into a much larger
role in law enforcement and a host of other duties that threaten to
infringe on our longstanding tradition of civilian control of the military.
Overseas, our forces are being asked to play markedly different roles
under the auspices of NATO and the United Nations. At the same time,
the American taxpayer is forced to bankroll the expansion of these
international organizations so that an even greater role in the
international arena can be carved for our armed forces in the future. Not
content with changes in the domestic and foreign missions of the
military, reformers have pushed hard for changes in the internal policies
of the services as well, insisting on greater roles for women and
homosexuals.

3
34

See id.
Id. at 365.

ns Quotation by A.J. Bacevich, Executive Director, the Foreign Policy Institute at the Paul
H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Id. at 387.
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Ironically, the fundamental changes in national military policy come
at the same time the military must drastically reduce its size and budget.
As a result, many analysts worry about the readiness and morale of our
troops. In a second irony, the push for fundamental reforms comes at a
time when the public's approval rating of the military has reached a
high. In 1993, despite the Tailhook scandal, the debate over the "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy, and a host of other worries, a Harris poll found
that "[n]o other major institution, profession, or interest group comes
326
close" to matching the popularity of the military among Americans.
Obviously, the .public still respects and cares for its fighting forces. Yet
both of these ironies prompt the question: With the public apparently
satisfied with the traditional role of the military and the armed forces
already having to undergo the stresses of downsizing and realignment,
why is there such a push to thrust fundamental and questionable
changes upon it? The only answer to that can be the political mileage
that comes with championing new roles for the military. Regrettably,
however, this is a dangerous turn of events. The military has always
been-and always should be-apolitical.
Someone should step to the forefront and stop this dangerous trend.
As many observers have noted, "[e]ach day brings America nearer to its
next military conflict."3 27
When that unfortunate but historically
inevitable day comes, we will once again look to the call of the ancient
prophets:
Beat your plowshares into swords, and your pruninghooks into
328
spears. Let the weak say, "I am strong."
America's armed forces have always responded to this call with
vigor and have defended the nation with honor. Only next time, if the
current trend continues, the military may be forced to respond by saying,
"Sorry, but that's not my job anymore."

326

327
3

Dunlap, supra note 6,at 354.
Mersereau, supra note 272.

28Joel
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329
Appendix I: U.S. Military Operations in the 1990's

May - June 1997
Operation Noble Obelisk: Noncombat evacuation in Sierra Leone.
March - June 1997
Operation Silver Wake: Embassy security and noncombatant evacuation
in Albania.
January 1997 - present
Operation Northern Watch: Combined task force to enforce the no-fly
zone in northern Iraq (above 36th parallel); follow-on to Operation
Provide Comfort.
September 1996 - April 1997
Operation Pacific Haven: Humanitarian assistance to Kurdish evacuees
in northern Iraq at Guam.
September i996 - January 1997
Operation Desert Strike: Missile strikes in response to Iraq's aggression
against the Kurds in northern Iraq and to facilitate expansion of the nofly zone established under Operation Southern Watch.
August 1996 - present
Operation Desert Focus: Relocation of U.S. service personnel and
Department of Defense civilians and force protection in Saudi Arabia.
Summer of 1996
Joint Task Force Atlanta/Olympic Security Support Group: Direct
security and support for civilian police agencies during the 1996
Olympics in Atlanta.
May - August 1996
Operation Quick Response: Embassy security and noncombatant
evacuation in Central African Republic.
April - August 1996
Operation Assured Response: Embassy security and noncombatant
evacuation in Liberia.

329 Compiled

almost exclusively from DEFENSE 97, Issue 5 (published by the American
Forces Information Service for the Department of Defense). This list does not include
operations after 1997.
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April 1996- present
Operation Laser Strike: Counternarcotics surge operations in South
America.
December 1995- present
Operation Joint Guard: Ground operations in Bosnia; NATO
Stabilization Force operations; NATO Implementation Force operation.
Follow-on to Operation Joint Endeavor.
December 1995- present
Operation Determined Guard: Combined maritime operation in support
Follow-on to Operation Decisive
of Operation Joint Guard.
Enhancement.
October - December 1995
Operation Green Clover: Counternarcotics surge operations in South
America.
August - September 1995
Operation Deliberate Force: NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb
military targets in response to Serb shelling of Sarajevo and refusal to
withdraw heavy weapons from a 20 kilometer radius of Sarajevo.
August 1995 - February 1997
Operation Vigilant Sentinel: U.S. strategic show of force operations in
U.S. Central Command's area of operations to deter potential Iraqi
aggression.
March 1995 - present
Operation Safe Border: U.S. participation in the six-nation Military
Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru to monitor the border.
January - February 1995
Operation Safe Passage: Transfer of Cuban immigrants from Operation
Safe Haven camps in Panama to Guantanamo, Cuba.
November 1994 - March 1995
Operation United Shield: Security support for withdrawal of U.N. forces
from Somalia.
October - December 1994
Operation Vigilant Warrior: Defense of Kuwait against renewed Iraqi
threat.
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September 1994 - February 1995
Operation Safe Haven: Joint humanitarian Cuban migrant operations in
Panama (U.S. forces temporarily housed 8,600 Cuban migrants in four
camps to relieve pressure at Guantanamo, Cuba).
September 1994 - March 1995
Operation Uphold Democracy: Multinational operation to restore
democratically elected government in Haiti (administratively, this
operation is still open; in November 1994 a name change was announced
calling it Operation Maintain Democracy, but the initial name was
ultimately retained).
July - October 1994
Operation Support Hope: Humanitarian relief/relief support operations
to assist Rwandan refugees.
May 1994 - February 1996
Operation Sea Signal: Joint task force operations to support Haitian and
Cuban migrants in Guantanamo, Cuba.
April 1994
Operation Distant Runner:
noncombatants from Rwanda.

Evacuation

of

U.S.

and

Belgian

October 1993 - September 1994
Operation Support Democracy: Maritime intercept operations with allied
navies to enforce U.S. Security Council sanctions against Haiti.
July 1993 - present
Operation Able Sentry: U.S. participation in the U.N. operation to
observe the Serbian/Macedonian border.
May 1993 - March 1994
Operation Continue Hope: Conducted under U.N. auspices to continue
humanitarian relief in Somalia.
April 1993 - present
Operation Deliberate Guard: Air operations over Bosnia in support of
Operation Joint Guard. Follow-on to Operation Decisive Edge.
December 1992 - May 1993
Operation Restore Hope: Establish security to facilitate humanitarian
relief in Somalia.
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October 1992
Joint Task Force Liberia: Noncombatant evacuation in Liberia.
October 1992
Joint Task Force Tajikistan: Noncombatant evacuation in Tajikistan.
September - October 1992
Joint Task Force Hawaii: Disaster Relief on Kauai following Typhoon
Iniki.
August - October 1992
Joint Task Force Andrew: Disaster Relief in south Florida following
Hurricane Andrew.
August - September 1992
Joint Task Force Marianas: Disaster Relief on Guam following Typhoon
Omar.
August 1992 - February 1993
Operation Provide Relief: Humanitarian airlift operations to airlift food
supplies to Somalia and Somalian refugees in Kenya.
August 1992 - present
Operation Southern Watch: Coalition force enforcement of no-fly zone in
southern Iraq for all Iraqi aircraft (below 32rid parallel until September
1996, below 33rd parallel thereafter).
July 1992 - February 1996
Operation Provide Promise: Multinational operation
humanitarian relief activities in Bosnia- Hercegovina.

to support

June 1992 - September 1996
Operation Sharp Guard: Enforcement of the U.N.-sanctioned embargo
against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and surveillance of cargo
being transported through the Adriatic.
June 1992
Joint Task Force Sarajevo: Noncombatant evacuation on Sarajevo.
May 1992
Joint Task Force Los Angeles: Active forces integrated with California
National Guard to support civilian authorities responding to incidents of
rioting, looting, and violence in the wake of the Rodney King verdict.
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May 1992
Noncombatant evacuation of non-essential personnel from Sierra Leone.
January 1992 - December 1994
Operation Provide Hope: Emergency humanitarian relief operations to
airlift excess Department of Defense medical supplies and food stuffs to
the Commonwealth of Independent States.
January 1992 - present
Joint Task Force Full Accounting: Operations to resolve the cases of
Americans still unaccounted for from the Vietnam War and other
conflicts.
May - June 1991
Operation Sea Angel: Humanitarian relief in Bangladesh.
April 1994 - December 1996
Operation Provide Comfort: Combined task force to enforce the no-fly
zone over northern Iraq (above 36th parallel) and to support coalition
humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq.
January - March 1991
Operation Proven Force: Coalition combat operations in northern Iraq.
January - March 1991
Operation Desert Storm: Coalition combat operations to liberate Kuwait.
January 1991
Operation Eastern Exit: Noncombatant evacuation from Somalia.
August 1990 - January 1991
Operation Desert Shield: Defense of Saudi Arabia.
August 1990 - present
Arabian Gulf Maritime Intercept Operations: Enforcement of U.N.
sanctions against Iraqi oil and other imports/exports.
July 1990 - present
Counterdrug operations: U.S. military operational support to the United
States and participating nations' law enforcement agencies conducting
counterdrug operations in the western hemisphere.
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May 1990 - January 1991
Operation Sharp Edge: Noncombatant evacuation from Monrovia,
Liberia.
December 1989 - January 1990
Operation Just Cause: Joint operation to protect U.S. citizens and
property, restore democracy, safeguard the Panama Canal, and bring
Manuel Noriega to justice.
April 1982 - present
Multinational Force and Observers Sinai: Monitoring provisions of the
peace accord between Israel and Egypt.
Note: Adding to this impressive list of largely humanitarian,
peacekeeping, and counterdrug operations, one reporter notes that U.S.
forces have also participated in recovery/investigation/medical efforts
following the crashes of flights TWA 800 off Long Island and KAL 801
on Guam, and have trained and supported federal law enforcement
officials participating in the Waco and Ruby Ridge raids.33° "And if all
these noncombat duties were not enough, the Pentagon has come up
with a proposal for another: protecting the environment in Latin
America. In June [1997] it was announced at the Western Hemisphere
Defense Environment Conference in Miami that soldiers from the U.S.
Southern Command, which oversees American military operations in
Central and South America, may soon begin training soldiers in
protecting the rain forests and endangered species." 331 In response to
this future role, the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs said, "This
is a legitimate military issue. This is not a bunch of trendy greenies." 332

330 See Martz, supra note 2.

331 Id.

3M2Id.
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